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ABSTRACT
Market failure can have serious negative consequences on human welfare,
including various health risks to people. How to best correct market failure becomes an
important question. Different approaches may reduce market failure, such as direct
government regulation, or market based approaches. This research explores consumers’
or societies’ reactions to market failure and approaches to reduce market failure.
The first study uses a random utility model and a choice experiment method to
estimate Chinese parents’ marginal willingness-to-pay for potential policy changes that
target overall food safety. Results suggest that a policy that provides both direct
government regulation and information to create incentives for market solutions can
obtain more financial support and be supported by a larger share of respondents.
The second study explores money-risk tradeoffs when risks are due to information
asymmetry. The data suggest that a majority of respondents prefer a brand that is more
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expensive and perceived to be safer compared to a brand that is cheaper and perceived to
be less safe. Respondents’ choices may be influenced by how they weigh the concern of
inconsistency between price and safety and health concerns, as well as the relative
magnitude of the price difference and perceived safety difference between the two brands.
The last study develops a dynamic model of resource extraction and pollution
emissions between two agents under a cap-and-trade system, using general functional
forms. It explores the tradeoff between the use of pollution reduction technology and the
purchase of emissions permits, the relationship between resource extraction and pollution
emissions, and the interaction between two agents. Possible optimal time path of resource
extraction and pollution emissions are also discussed.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Market failure is a common issue in real-world markets, which can happen when
a market allocates resources inefficiently. Different approaches may reduce market
failure, including government approach such as direct regulation or market approach such
as the creation of a market with clearly defined property rights. The latter approach
involves little or no government intervention. A good approach should be feasible,
effective, and cost efficient.
A market can be a complicated system that is formed by different parties with
heterogeneous interests. Each party’s reactions to an issue and interactions among parties
can have a significant impact on the market. This research focuses on reactions to market
failure and different approaches to provide insight to the process of finding and
evaluating solutions to reduce market failure. Specifically, I focus on reactions to market
failure to find potential solutions, reactions to potential solutions to find a preferred
solution, and reactions under a preferred solution. I use the Chinese food market and a
general carbon market as examples.
Different markets or sectors have their unique characteristics, which can lead to
different approaches to reduce market failure. In the food market, there is no consensus
on the best approach. Therefore, I focus on reactions to market failure and potential
solutions. On the other hand, in the environmental sector, approaches to decrease market
failure like climate change, such as command-and-control and cap-and-trade, have been
studied for years. Cap-and-trade is considered as a preferred solution. Therefore, I study
reactions under a preferred solution in the carbon market.
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1.1 Market Failure in Food Markets
Market failure in food markets happens when there is asymmetric information
between consumers and producers or imperfect available information (Verbeke 2005). In
most cases, consumers lack information about the true level of food safety. This offers
producers the opportunity to produce food that is less safe at a lower cost, without being
revealed in the short run.
Compared to other products, food is closely related to our daily lives. Information
asymmetry may make it difficult for people to choose among food brands. More
importantly, safety issues in the food market can have an immediate and massive impact
on human health and lives. Unsafe food is the cause of more than 200 diseases. Every
year about one out of ten people fall ill and 420,000 die, with 40% of them children under
5 years old, due to the consumption of unsafe food in the world (WHO 2015a).
In other markets, a market approach may solve market failure by compensating
the damaged party. But this is not applicable in the food market, because damage to life
and health cannot be adequately compensated for by money. Food safety issues should be
prevented before they cause any damage (Stiglitz 2008).

1.2 Climate Change
Climate change, a market failure caused by an externality, is considered by some
as the greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen (Stern 2007). A society can
emit greenhouse gas (GHG) that increases in concentration in the atmosphere and can
cause damage to other societies.
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Climate change also influences human health and lives. For instance, extreme
temperature increases death rates from heart and respiratory diseases; higher pollen and
other aeroallergen levels in extreme heat can cause asthma; heavy precipitation also
influences the quality of drinking-water and causes disease (WHO 2012; Solheim et al.
2010).
However, the consequences of climate change are much more insidious because
they happen slowly over time, especially when compared to some issues in the food
market. Some consequences of climate change, such as the reduction of biodiversity, may
be less observable in our daily lives. But the transboundary and cumulative damage over
time can have a profound negative impact on the earth and human welfare all over the
world, for generations to come.

1.3 Contributions of This Dissertation
Considering the characteristics and causes of market failure in the food and
carbon markets discussed in sections 1.1 and 1.2, Chapter 2 uses the choice experiment
method to investigate Chinese parents’ preferences for potential changes in food safety
policies and estimate parents’ marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP) for those changes.
Chapter 3 applies logistic regression and expected utility theory to investigate the implicit
tradeoff parents make between money and health risks under an information asymmetry
framework in the Chinese milk market. Chapter 4 builds a dynamic game model to
investigate the optimal time path of resource extraction and greenhouse gas emissions
between two societies under a cap-and-trade policy.

3

The contribution Chapter 2 makes is that it considers Chinese parents’ preferences
towards three types of food safety policies, rather than safety related characteristics of
one food item or one group of food. Given that food safety incidents involve a variety of
food products in China, the analysis in this chapter can provide a more thorough analysis
to evaluate potential food safety policies for the improvement of overall food safety. Data
collected through a unique discrete choice survey in China’s Hunan province is used to
estimate the marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP) for food safety policy changes. Both
the population mean MWTP and individual-specific MWTP are estimated using
multinomial logit models and random parameter logit models, which allow for
heterogeneous preferences. Individual-specific MWTP is not commonly discussed in the
choice experiment literature on food. But the two types of MWTP allow policy makers to
evaluate policies from different perspectives in terms of maximizing funding and/or
obtaining greater consumer support.
Chapter 3 investigates parents’ choice of milk with information asymmetry in a
market that is similar to the “lemons principle” (Akerlof 1970). But instead of assuming
the choice is between a product with a low price/low quality and a product with a high
price/possible high quality, this chapter replaces quality by safety to reflect an important
issue in food market. It also includes multiple levels of safety and price to capture how
the magnitude of safety and price can influence parental choice. The empirical analysis
explores influential factors for the choice of milk. It also compares parents’ choice of
milk with the lemons principle. In some markets, consumers’ main concern may be the
inconsistency between price and quality. But in the food market, consumers are also
concerned about health. Also, the risk neutral assumption in the lemons principle may not
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be sufficient to describe all consumers. Therefore, a theoretical model is built to address
these issues and explain empirical results.
Chapter 4 incorporates resource extraction, clean technology and carbon trade
into a dynamic game of pollution emissions between two agents under a cap-and-trade
system, using general functional forms. To find the optimal resource extraction and GHG
emissions over time, it graphically explores the tradeoff between the use of clean
technology and the purchase of emission permits, allowing for damage from pollution
stock. It also graphically explores the interdependency of resource extraction with clean
technology, carbon trade, and pollution stock over time for two identical agents. Finally,
using the scenario of identical agents as the starting point, this chapter discusses how the
optimal path of resource extraction and pollution emissions differ, when there is a
difference in net benefits from resource extraction, difference in cost of clean technology,
or difference in damage from pollution stock, separately.

1.4 Overview of Results
In the food market, I find that parents prefer a strong tool that allows both
government and market approaches to reduce market failure in Chapter 2. Meanwhile,
parents’ choices of food in Chapter 3 create the potential for a market solution. Given that
some government approaches can be costly, policies that only involves a market
approach may be a good supplement for policies involves both government and market
approaches.
In the carbon market, I find that cap-and-trade reduces pollution emissions over
time. It also allows agents to maximize the welfare by choosing the resource extraction

5

and different methods to deal with each unit of pollution generated from the resource,
such as the use of technology to eliminate the pollution, and the purchase of permits to
emit the pollution. Therefore, it is effective and efficient.
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CHAPTER 2: You Are What You Eat: The Choice of Food Safety Policies in China

2.1 Background
Ensuring food safety is a challenge for many countries. 600 million people fell ill
and 420,000 people died worldwide from foodborne diseases in 2010 (WHO 2015b). As
incomes grow, consumers have increasing demand for safe food (IAASTD 2009). But
consumers face a variety of both old and new food safety risks, including foodborne
diseases caused by diarrheal disease agents and the use of new materials by the food
industry that impact the safety of food products (Lin et al. 2010; WHO 2015b).
China provides a good example of the challenges of trying to ensure food safety.
Historically, as a developing country with a large population and limited farm land,
China experienced food shortages. After market reforms in 1978, China’s GDP growth
rate averaged nearly 10% a year (The World Bank 2016). This rapid economic growth
relieved the pressure of food shortages and allowed people to turn their attention to food
quality and safety. The Chinese Household Survey shows that urban households purchase
higher-quality food as income increases; food safety concerns are one of the reasons cited
for additional food spending by high-income households (Gale and Huang 2007;
FORHEAD 2014)
In recent years, several high-profile food safety incidents have resulted in death,
risks to health, and economic loss in China (Jiang et al. 2011). Three of the most
publicized cases included the addition of industrial dyes and chemicals to food products
and baby formula and the recycling of waste cooking oil.1

1

An industrial dye (Sudan IV) was fed to hens and ducks to enhance the appearance of egg yolks, even
when there was experimental evidence that industrial dyes caused cancer in animals and damaged their
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A number of factors have contributed to China’s food safety situation. First,
China has many small-scale food producers that are hard to regulate. The lack of
effective regulation and enforcement practices, coupled with a highly competitive and
non-credible food sector, has incentivized food producers to lower costs and to improve
food appearance by using unsafe raw materials or illegal additives. In addition, increased
consumption of processed food and longer and more complicated food supply chains has
also increased food safety risks (FORHEAD 2014; Qiu 2011).
A survey of Chinese people found that 39% of the urban respondents thought
food available in China was unsafe (P. Zhang, Zhang, and Tian 2008). In response, both
consumers and the Chinese government have been seeking effective ways to improve
food safety.
On the consumer side, there have been changes in the food consumption behavior.
For example, organic food consumption as a share of total food consumption increased
from 0.4% in 2007 to 1% in 2012, with a large proportion of these consumers residing in
large cities such as Beijing and Shanghai (Shanghai World Expo Exhibition &
Convertion Center, n.d.; Li, n.d.). Given the higher cost of organic food compared to its
conventional counterparts (for instance, organic vegetables may be 3 to 15 times more
expensive), this consumption increase likely reflects that people are willing to pay more
for food that is perceived to be safer (Lagos et al. 2010). There is also evidence that
Chinese customers, especially parents, are paying more attention to food labeling and

genes (Kwok and Yau 2006). Another case revealed that melamine, an industrial chemical, was added to
baby formula to replace the nitrogen from protein in diluted raw milk, since the test of protein level of milk
usually focuses on its nitrogen content (WHO 2016). This caused six deaths and affected the health of
300,000 infants (NBC News 2008). A third incident exposed the practice of using recycled waste cooking
oil from the drains by street food vendors and restaurants. This oil is unhygienic and contains carcinogens
and heavy metals that cause various diseases (Food Safety Information 2016).
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ingredients. In a recent survey, 62% of parents stated that food ingredients and additives
always or often affected their purchasing behavior (Weber Shandwick 2014).
The Chinese government has also taken actions to improve food safety. There are
several types of policies that can improve food safety, including regulatory policies,
information policies, and third party policies. Regulatory policies use laws and
government regulations to ensure food safety in food production chains. This type of
policies allows consumers to put less effort into improving food safety themselves.
Requiring a food safety management system is an example of a regulatory policy.
Information policies provide safety related information about food to the government and
consumers. Development of a traceability system is an information policy. This type of
policies allows consumers to obtain better knowledge about the safety of their food and
helps them make purchasing decisions, which can influence the market from the demand
side. Third-party policies encourage the participation of third parties in improving food
safety, such encouraging food safety inspections by a non-governmental organization
(NGO). This type of policies can potentially increase the number of unbiased sources that
supervise food safety.
In the early 2000s, the Chinese government started developing and promoting
Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP), a food safety management system,
initially for food exports (China Quality Certification Centre 2016).2 However, HACCP
has a low implementation rate in the domestic market, both because the system is
voluntary for food producers and because there is a lack of financial support and
incentives (Bai, Zhang, and Jiang 2013; WHO 2015b; Jin, Zhou, and Ye 2008). At the

2

HACCP is a food management system in which food safety is addressed through the analysis and control
of biological, chemical, and physical hazards from raw material production, procurement and handling, to
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same time, the government also began gradually developing food traceability systems, a
mix of regulatory and information policies, in cities such as Shanghai and Beijing. But
these traceability systems currently exist only for limited food categories and regions.
One barrier to developing food traceability systems in China is the high implementation
costs due to the number of small-scale food producers (Xu and Wu 2010; He and Chen
2014; S. Wang et al. 2014). Both traceability systems and food safety management
systems are effective approaches in the prevention and management of food safety
hazards (FAO and WHO 2003; Revision Committee on the Handbook for Introduction of
Food Traceability Systems 2007). However, better incentives and greater financial
support may be required to get the government and food producers to further develop and
implement those systems in the Chinese domestic food market.
After the series of food safety incidents, the Chinese government implemented
additional regulatory policies actions to improve the efficiency of food safety regulation.
In 2013, several food regulatory departments were combined to form the China Food and
Drug Administration. Previously, several departments were in charge of food regulations
with different, but sometimes unclearly divided, responsibilities. The stated goal of
creating the China Food and Drug Administration was to eliminate segmented
management and to create a single agency that could guarantee the supervision of each
stage in the food supply. In 2015, the government implemented a new Food Safety Law
considered to be the toughest food safety law in Chinese history. It includes a stricter
regulatory system, more and harsher punishments for non-complying food producers, and
it emphasizes greater accountability from government agents (Legal Daily 2015).

10

Implementing policy changes to increase food safety costs money and will likely
increase food prices. This is notable because of the large share that Chinese consumers
already spend on food. For example, in 2013, 26% of the total expenditures by Chinese
consumers was on food, which was almost four times that of US consumers (USDA
2015). Effective policies require knowing whether consumers can and are willing to pay
for increased food safety. It is also important to understand whether consumers are more
supportive of regulatory, information, or third-party policies to increase food safety.
Understanding these two issues can provide policy makers insight on consumers’ demand
for food safety policies and allow policy makers to evaluate the feasibility of policies.
The choice experiment (CE) method can be used to find consumers’ marginal
willingness-to-pay (MWTP) for different food safety policies simultaneously through
their trade-offs among policies and the increase of food expenditure caused by the
implementation of policies. This method is increasingly applied in the food literature to
find consumers’ MWTPs for attributes of certain products in a number of countries
(Loureiro and Umberger 2007; Combris et al. 2009; Tonsor et al. 2009; Ortega, Wang,
Wu, et al. 2011; Probst et al. 2012; Doherty and Campbell 2014; Yahaya, Yamoah, and
Adams 2015).
Previous studies have found that in most cases, attributes related to safety, such as
certification and traceability, tend to have relatively higher MWTPs than other attributes
such as appearance and taste. Chinese consumers tend to have lower MWTPs for safetyrelated attributes that involve private organizations compared to safety-related attributes
that involve government; government is considered more trustworthy than private
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organizations (Loureiro and Umberger 2007; Ortega et al. 2011; Ortega et al. 2012; Wolf,
Tonsor, and Olynk 2011; Van Loo et al. 2011; Lim et al. 2013; Wu et al. 2015).
Previous choice experiment studies have focused on the mean MWTPs for safetyrelated attributes of one food or one category of food, such as beef or vegetables (Probst
et al. 2012; Loureiro and Umberger 2007). However, most food policy will target overall
food safety. Using the mean MWTPs from studies of specific foods or general categories
of food to target overall food safety can only provide limited information due to three
issues.
First, one food or one category of food is not particularly representative of all
food in the market. Consumers may value the same attribute for a variety of products
differently. For instance, compared to some fruit they barely eat, consumers may be
willing to pay more to make beef traceable. Therefore, their willingness-to-pay for
traceable beef is not the same as their willingness-to-pay for having a traceability system
on all food items in the market.
Second, people may have competing preferences towards safety-related attributes,
which cannot be reflected by the mean MWTPs. In other words, it is possible that the
average people are willing to pay for an attribute but a few people are not willing to pay
for it. If policy makers implement the change based on the average people, those who are
not willing to pay for the change will not be satisfied. When this change is for one food
or one category of food, people who are not willing to pay for the change may switch to a
substitute and may not be affected. But when this change is for all food, people who are
not willing to pay for the change may not find substitutes and be forced to pay for
something they do not like. Therefore, a food safety policy that intends to benefit more
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people would require a good understanding of the distributions of MWTP for all
respondents instead of only the average respondents.
Finally, affordability is not an important concern to consumers when they only
face a small change in the unit price of one product. But affordability may play a very
important role in consumers’ attitudes and preferences when policy changes affect all
food products and cause a large change in total food expenditures. For instance, if the
price of beef has to increase by one dollar when it becomes traceable, consumers may not
pay much attention to whether they can afford this relatively small increase. Consumers
who prefer untraceable beef are more likely to be those who do not like traceability or
those who do not think a traceability system for beef worth one more dollar. However, if
the total food expenditure increases by 200 dollars when all food items in the market
become traceable, this relatively large increase of food expenditure can easily exceed
their budget. It is more likely that some consumers who like traceability are forced to
prefer untraceable food since they cannot afford such increase. Therefore, it is important
to address affordability issue when I consider MWTP for overall food safety; otherwise, I
may overestimate the MWTPs.
In this study, I address these limitations of previous studies by considering four
potential food safety changes that target overall food safety: a government requirement
that food producers must implement a food safety management system (Management), an
increase in the percentage of traceable food in the market to 10% from its current level of
less than 1% (Traceability), publication of all food safety inspection results on a
centralized governmental website (CentralizedWeb), and provision of routine
supplemental food safety inspection by non-governmental organizations (NGO). These
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four changes represent regulatory policy, a mix of regulatory and information policies,
information policy and third-party policy respectively. Each of these food safety changes
were attributes in a CE question survey, along with the increase in monthly household
food expenditures. I also asked respondents to state their largest affordable increase in
food expenditure, so as to account for affordability in my model. In this study, I explore
the distributions of individual-specific MWTP for all four changes, in addition to the
average MWTPs.
I find and compare consumers’ MWTPs for the four food safety changes using
primary data collected from a choice experiment (CE) survey of parents’ attitudes
towards food safety in Hunan province, China. This survey had a response rate of 87%.
The data shows that in general respondents were strongly opposed to the status quo. They
were willing to pay for all four changes that potentially improve food safety. The mean
MWTPs tended to be higher for regulatory policies, including Management and
Traceability. However, respondents differed significantly in terms of their attitudes and
values for the four changes. Traceability and NGO had more supporters than
Management and CentralizedWeb.

2.2 Survey and Data
2.2.1 Survey Population
In 2013, I conducted an anonymous valuation and attitudinal survey about food
safety issues among urban parents of young children (approximately six and seven years
old) in two cities (Changsha and Huaihua) of Hunan province, China. I targeted urban
parents because urban families tend to consume more processed food and, thus, are more
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likely to be exposed to food safety risks. In addition, young children are also more
vulnerable to food safety risks.
Hunan province was chosen as the study site because it is an important
agricultural province in south central China that faces a number of food safety concerns
such as heavy-metal polluted agricultural products and the use of illegal additives (C.
Zhang, Liu, and He 2014; L. Wang et al. 2008). It also has a high population density with
an area of 211,800 square kilometers (2.2% of China) and a population of 66 million (5%
of Chinese population), including 4.7 million elementary students (Population Census
Office under the State Council and Department of Population and Employment Statistics
National Bureau of Statistics 2012; Xiao 2014). Food safety incidents could have a wide
impact in this province.

2.2.2 Survey Instrument
The survey development process included focus group discussions, individual
interviews, and a pretest. The final questionnaire consisted of four sections and a total of
33 questions, which took approximately 20 minutes to complete.
The first section of the survey describes the five attributes from the CE questions
(see Table 2.1). After the description of each attribute, there are two to three questions
designed to gauge respondents’ attitudes, knowledge, and/or behaviors related to each
attribute.
The first attribute is whether or not the government should require food producers
to implement a food safety management system (Management), such as HACCP. Food
safety management systems are designed to identify, evaluate, and control hazards to
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food safety in each segment of the food production, processing and distribution chain
(Codex 1997). These can be applicable to large businesses as well as small and/or less
developed businesses, which are common in the Chinese food industry (WHO 1999).
Food safety management systems are not mandatory in China. Therefore, only about
5,000 food enterprises had HACCP certifications by 2011 and 4,000 food enterprises
with the certification were involved in international trade in 2015 (China Quality
Certification Centre 2016; China National Accreditation Service for Conformity
Assessment 2015). Those enterprises are a small proportion of the over 100,000 licensed
food producers (The State Council Information Office 2007). The government could
make food safety management systems mandatory to improve food safety in the domestic
market. This attribute is an example of regulatory policy.
The second attribute is the percentage of traceable food in the market
(Traceability). Traceable food allows consumers to obtain detailed information about
each stage of the food production, processing and distribution.3 A traceability system also
helps the government to identify and control sources of hazard when food safety
incidents occur. At the time of the survey, less than one percent of the food sold in Hunan
was traceable and the city of Changsha was planning development of a traceability
system for certain foods such as meat and vegetables (implemented in 2016) (Sanxiang
Metro News 2012; Liu 2016). Traceability is an example of the mix of regulatory and
information policies.
The third attribute is how the government publishes food safety inspection results
online (CentralizedWeb). 62% of Chinese urban residents can access the internet and
3

For example, the Chinese branch of an international chain supermarket called Metro has a unique code for
its products so that consumers can access information regarding the farmer who produced the raw materials,
the factory that processed the food, and the food safety inspection reports.
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more than half of internet users were between 20 and 39 years old in 2013 (China Internet
Network Information Center 2013). Thus, the population of my study had internet access.
But at the time of the survey, different food safety inspection results were published on
different websites. It is inconvenient for consumers to check on multiple websites
whether the food they purchased passed the safety inspections. The government could
build a centralized website that publishes all food safety inspection results from agencies
across the country. This will make it easier for consumers to access the information and
guide their choices of food brands. This attribute is an example of information policy.
The fourth attribute is whether or not NGOs should provide routine supplemental
food safety inspections (NGO). In general, NGOs have a relatively small presence in
China. Currently, there are very few domestic NGOs that focus on food safety, with the
first food NGO formed in 2013 (Woodpecker Food Safety Center, n.d.). NGOs currently
provide a limited number of sporadic small-scaled supplemental food safety inspections
to help consumers identify unsafe food. If NGOs conduct routine supplemental food
safety inspections, the number of inspections and the chances of detecting unsafe food
would increase. This attribute is an example of third-party policy.
The last attribute is the size of the increase in monthly household food
expenditures (Cost). The Cost attribute has 12 levels ranging from 25 yuan to 1,500 yuan
per month.4 The status quo of the cost attribute is 0 yuan.
The second section of the survey has four CE questions. Each CE question
provided two food safety plans with potential changes related to food safety and the
status quo (see Figure 2.1). It asked respondents to choose the most preferred alternative.

4

At the time of the survey, 1 yuan=0.16 US dollar.
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Focus groups and individual interviews did not suggest any potential interactions
between attributes; thus, I created a main-effects generic design (i.e., no interactions
between attributes and generic alternatives). Given the number of attributes and
corresponding levels, I elected to create a design of 16 choice sets. Focus groups and
individual interviews suggested that individuals could comfortably complete four choice
sets of three alternatives (two alternatives plus status quo) without a sense of burden;
thus, elected to have four choice sets per version, resulting in four versions of the survey.
The design was generated using a modified Fedorov candidate-set-search
algorithm using the “%choiceff” macro in SAS (Kuhfeld 2001). Under this macro, a
random design of the specified size is selected from the full factorial design. Alternatives
are swapped in, in an attempt to minimize the D-error. 200 initial random designs were
used. The design with the minimum D-error, which minimizes the variance matrix for a
multinomial logit discrete choice model, is chosen. For my design, I made no
assumptions about the value of the s (i.e., =0). While this resulted in a less efficient
design than would have been achieved with using assumed values for the

s, I

determined it provided a safer design. While I was confident about the expected sign of
cost, I suspected significant heterogeneity with respect to some of the other variables and
thus did not want to impose an expected sign on these attributes. After the final design
was chosen, I added a constant status-quo alternative to each choice set.
The third section of the survey includes questions on choices of food, averting
behaviors, and reactions towards food safety and quality problems. The last section asks
for demographic information such as gender, education, and age. These two sections
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allow me to find whether there are heterogeneous preferences among people with
different characteristics.

2.2.3 Survey Implementation
I randomly selected eight elementary schools from Changsha and Huaihua, two
cities in Hunan province. The survey was implemented among parents of first- and
second-year students (i.e., approximately six and seven years old). I did not focus on
younger children from daycare or preschools because elementary school is free and
mandatory, resulting in almost a 100% enrollment rate. In contrast, daycare/preschool is
optional and parents must cover the cost. Thus, elementary school provides a more
representative sample of households.
I sent out 1,385 hard copies of the Chinese-version of the survey to parents via
their children. Children were asked to return the completed surveys at their schools
within two days. As this was an IRB-approved anonymous survey, parents were only
contacted once.

2.2.4 Survey Respondents
I received 1,205 responses, resulting in a response rate of 87%. This provides
choices from 4,820 CE questions. Summary statistics of the attributes from the survey
responses are very close to the survey design, which indicates fairly even responses
across four versions of the survey. After dropping choices of unaffordable plans, I have
choices from 1,185 respondents and 4,540 CE questions.5

5

I asked respondents to provide the maximum amount of increase in food expenditure that they can afford
in the survey. In some choice sets, some respondents chose a plan with a cost higher than their affordable
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Summary statistics of selected variables used in the models are presented in Table
2.2.6 On average, respondent households can afford a maximum increase of 170 yuan per
capita for monthly food expenditure, which was approximately 2% of the average
disposable income of urban residents of Hunan.7 It is common for them to have various
averting behaviors to food safety, with a median of three behaviors.8 Respondents had a
median of 12 years of education; the majority of respondents had finished high school or
junior college.
I cannot test the representativeness of this sample because there is no available
demographic information for urban parents of elementary students in first and second
year in these two cities. I can only present a comparison between all residents of
Changsha and Huaihua and my sample (see Table 2.3). The possible range of per capita
food expenditure in my sample was lower than the population per capita food expenditure
in Changsha. But the possible range of food expenditure per capita in my sample
included the population per capita food expenditure in Huaihua. Therefore, my sample
had a lower per capita food expenditure in Changsha and a comparable per capita food
expenditure in Huaihua. Respondents in my sample also tended to be more educated than
the population. This is likely because, as parents of young children, my respondents were
from a cohort that had more access to schooling. Given the high response rate of 87%, the
mandatory nature of early elementary education, and the distribution of schools included
increase in food expenditure. I drop responses from those plans since they are not realistic. However, the
results before and after dropping those responses are not significantly different.
6
Several of the variables in Table 2 are centered around median values for the purpose of analysis. Here,
for ease of presentation, I discuss the uncentered data.
7
The annual per capita disposable income of urban residents of Hunan is 23,414 yuan at the time of the
survey (National Bureau of Statistics Survey Office in Hunan, n.d.).
8
Averting behaviors in this study include avoiding food with high safety risks, only choosing brands they
trust, using rules of thumb to choose relatively safer food, making processed food at home, growing
vegetables or raising poultry by themselves, getting agricultural products from their farmer relatives, and
purchasing imported foods.
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in the study, it seems reasonable to conclude that this sample was representative of the
population of interest.

2.3 Model
I utilize the typical Random Utility Model (McFadden 1974). Model 2.1 is
multinomial logit (MNL) model assuming homogeneous preferences across respondents.
All are assumed independent and identically distributed. The indirect utility function of
respondent

where

choosing alternative in a choice set

is

is an alternative specific constant associated with the status quo. It

captures potential status quo bias.
The assumption of homogeneous preferences is a simplifying assumption: in fact,
one would expect respondents to differ in their attitudes towards attributes and the status
quo. Respondents’ behaviors and demographics may influence or reflect their
preferences. To account for group-wise differences among respondents with different
characteristics, interactions between some of those characteristics and attributes or
ASC_sq are included in the indirect utility function for Model 2.2.
There may also exist some unobservable individual differences among
respondents, which can be captured by the Random Parameter Logit (RPL) model
(McFadden and Train 2000). Model 2.3 is an RPL model that allows respondents to have
different individual parameters; all parameters are allowed to be random. One must make
an assumption about the distribution of those parameters. The normal distribution allows
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the greatest flexibility in terms of the sign, while the log-normal distribution assumes a
certain sign for a parameter. Given that the marginal utility of Cost can potentially be
strictly negative, I compare models under two possible distributional assumptions: (1)
normal distribution for all parameters, and (2) log-normal distribution for parameter of
Cost and normal distribution for the remaining parameters. The model with a better fit
(lower AIC and BIC) is presented for Model 2.3.
Model 2.4.1 allows for both observable and unobservable heterogeneity, by
including interactions between socio-demographic variables and attributes or ASC_sq
within the RPL model. The same process discussed above was followed to determine the
appropriate distributional assumption for the random parameters.
Model 2.4.2 also allows for both observable and unobservable heterogeneity, but
restricts any random parameters that were found to have an insignificant standard
deviation in Model 2.4.1 to be fixed.
Unlike linear model, there is no R2 to measure goodness of fit for a discrete
choice model. The likelihood ratio index

is considered as an

analog of R2 for the discrete choice model. The full model includes all attributes (and
interactions) and the null model does not include any attributes or interactions. The LRI
ranges between 0 and 1. It does not have an interpretable meaning like R2. But when LRI
approaches 1, it means the model can perfectly predict each respondent’s choice. The
values of LRI for Models 2.1-2.4.2 are 0.26, 0.35, 0.32, 0.38 and 0.39 respectively. But
LRI cannot be used to compare those models (Train 2003). Also, LRI does not measure
model fit (Greene 2012).
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Estimated coefficients from Models 2.1-2.4.2 can reflect how attributes and status
quo influence respondents’ utility. But they are not meaningful for evaluating the
feasibility of policy changes. A more important measure for policy evaluation is the
MWTP, which is the increase of food expenditure associated with a policy change that
keeps respondents’ utility the same as the utility from the status quo.
The population mean MWTP can be calculated from
coefficient of non-cost attribute in the population.

, where

is the

is the coefficient of cost attribute in

the population. In the RPL model, there is also individual-specific MWTP that vary
across respondents. It has the same form as the population mean MWTP but

and

are individual coefficients for each respondent in the sample.9

2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 Model Estimation
Estimated results from Models 2.1 – 2.4.2 are presented in Table 2.4. All five
models consistently show significant positive coefficients for all four non-cost attributes
in the estimated utility function. This provides strong evidence that on average,
respondents were supportive of all four potential changes, including a government
requirement that food producers must implement a food safety management system
(Management), an increase in the percentage of traceable food in the market to 10% from
its current level of less than 1% (Traceability), publication of all food safety inspection

9

For models 2.2 and 2.4.2, this formula is for the representative respondents with a median level of
affordability per person (150 yuan), median number of averting behaviors (3), and median education level
(12 years).
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results on a centralized governmental website (CentralizedWeb), and provision of routine
supplemental food safety inspection by non-governmental organizations (NGO).
Models 2.2 – 2.4.2 also capture heterogeneous preferences across respondents.10
The significant estimated coefficients of interactions in Models 2.2 and 2.4.2 indicate
group-wise heterogeneous preferences among respondents with different affordability,
number of averting behaviors and education level. Meanwhile, the significant estimated
standard deviations in the RPL models (Models 2.3 and 2.4.2) indicate heterogeneous
preferences across individual respondents.
Among the four models considered, Model 2.4.2 (RPL normal with interactions),
that considers both group-wise and individual heterogeneous preference, provides the
best fit with the lowest AIC and BIC. This model suggests that respondents had different
preferences towards the four policy changes. Moreover, even though households that can
afford higher increase in food expenditure per person tended to care less about Cost and
be more opposed to the status quo, those with the same affordability and Cost still had
different attitudes toward Cost and the status quo.

2.4.2 Marginal Willingness-to-Pay
The monthly mean MWTPs in Chinese yuan from all models are calculated from
estimated coefficients and presented with 95% Krinsky-Robb confidence interval (CI) in

10

Model 4.1 and 4.2 are both RPL with interactions. Given that Model 4.2 is a better fit, I will only focus
on Model 4.2 for RPL with interactions. In both Models 3 and 4.1, all parameters were assumed random.
The standard deviation of all coefficients are significant in Model 3, but the standard deviation of
coefficients of Cost, ASC_sq, ASC_sq*averting and ASC_sq*edu were not significant in Model 4.1.
Assuming these four variables were fixed provides a better fit than assuming random parameters. Thus, in
Model 4.2, I assume the parameters for Cost, ASC_sq, ASC_sq*averting and ASC_sq*edu are fixed. Note
that even though the parameters of Cost and ASC_sq are fixed in Model 4.2, respondents’ attitude towards
Cost and status quo still vary since the parameters of Cost*affordability and ASC_sq*affordability are
random.
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Table 2.5. The Krinsky-Robb CIs indicate that those mean MWTPs are significantly
different from zero. In Models 2.2 and 2.4.2, socio-demographic variables in the
interactions are centered to their median level. The mean MWTPs in those two models
are from representative respondents who had a median level of affordability per person
(150 yuan), median number of averting behaviors (3), and median education level (12
years),
The status quo had negative mean MWTPs ranging from -186 to -136 yuan per
month across different models. In the best fitting model (Model 2.4.2), the mean MWTP
was -186 yuan per month; all else held constant, parents needed to be compensated 186
yuan per month on average to accept the status quo. 186 yuan represents 11% of the
average monthly household food expenditure. While a large number, it seems reasonable:
food safety was a serious issue at the time of the survey that affected human health and
lives. Similar to the findings of Ortega et al (2011), a large share of respondents (80% in
my survey) were concerned about food safety (Table 2.2). Given this, it is not surprising
that the mean MWTP to avoid the status quo was so high. In fact, 24% of respondents
never chose the status quo alternative in the survey.
The four proposed policy changes were generally viewed as positive by
respondents. Therefore, the average parents were willing to pay for all changes.
Moreover, the more they were willing to pay for a change, the more important the change
was considered by the parents.
The mean MWTPs for Management, a regulatory policy, ranged from 165 to 232
yuan per month across models. It consistently has the highest mean MWTP among the
policy attributes in all models. In the best fitting model (Model 2.4.2), the mean MWTP
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was 165 yuan per month, which was 10% of the average monthly household food
expenditure. This regulatory policy prevents food safety issues during the production and
distribution instead of relying on inspection of the final product. It decreases the food
safety risks for consumers without requiring effort from consumers. Therefore, it seems
reasonable that parents were willing to pay a significant amount of money for this policy
change and consider this change the most important of the four policy changes.
The mean MWTPs for Traceability, a mix of regulatory and information policies,
ranged from 108 to 136 yuan per month across models. In the best fitting model (Model
2.4.2), the mean MWTP was 115 yuan per month, which was 7% of the average monthly
household food expenditure. This mean MWTP was also relatively high among the four
policy attributes. From the government perspective, more food safety hazards can be
traced and efficiently regulated by the government due to this policy. From the consumer
perspective, this policy makes the source of food transparent for more food items. This
policy change requires more consumer involvement than Management, since the
consumer needs to know how to use the information and must spend extra time to use it
for food purchasing decisions. Both group discussions and previous studies showed that
some participants and consumers were not very familiar with traceable food and therefore
less likely to demand the traceability system (He and Chen 2014). Nevertheless, even if
consumers do not use the information, this change can still help the government to
improve food safety by allowing quicker identification of hazards.
The mean MWTPs for NGO, a third-party policy, ranged from 99 to 138 yuan per
month across models. In the best fitting model (Model 2.4.2), the mean MWTP was 103
yuan per month, which was 6% of the average monthly household food expenditure.
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NGOs in China are not as common as in other countries such as the US. Chinese people
tend to consider the government as more reliable than NGOs and the respondents tended
to be neutral to NGOs as shown in Table 2.2. In the focus group discussions, some
participants mentioned that if the government food inspections failed, inspectors might
lose their jobs but if NGOs’ food inspections failed, there might not be any punishment
for the NGO inspectors. This may explain the relatively lower mean MWTP for NGO.
The mean MWTPs for CentralizedWeb, an information policy, ranged from 63 to
76 yuan per month across models. It has the lowest mean MWTP in almost all models. In
the best fitting model (Model 2.4.2), the mean MWTP was 66 yuan per month, which
was 4% of the average monthly household food expenditure and significantly lower than
the other three changes. This information policy also requires actions by consumers to
improve food safety. Therefore, it is reasonable that CentralizedWeb had a low mean
MWTP.
Overall, respondents showed significant mean MWTPs for all four policy
changes. Even though Chinese people already spent a large proportion of their
expenditure on food, the mean MWTPs for each attribute ranged from 66 to 165 yuan per
month in the best fitting model, which was up to 10% of the average monthly household
food expenditure. This is consistent with findings from previous studies, where Chinese
people were willing to pay for food produced under HACCP and traceable food (Z.
Wang, Mao, and Gale 2008; Ortega, Wang, Wu, et al. 2011). Among the four policy
changes, the two regulatory policies (Management and Traceability) had relatively higher
mean MWTPs than the information and third-party policies. Ortega et al. (2011) and Bai
et al. (2013) also found that Chinese people were willing to pay more for attributes of

27

safety related service provided by the government over the third parties. The result of
mean MWTPs indicates that respondents trusted the government more than a third party,
likely due to the current social environment of China. It also suggests that respondents
preferred the government to use regulations to ensure food safety directly rather than
providing them with information that requires extra effort on their part to identify safe
food.
However, not every parent can or was willing to pay the same amount for those
changes due to their affordability and heterogeneous preferences. The mean MWTPs
discussed before can not reflect preferences of all respondents. Therefore, I explore the
variations in MWTPs across groups of respondents and individual respondents to fully
understand how parents value the four policy changes and the status quo.
To examine whether group-wise differences in MWTPs existed, I calculate
MWTPs using Model 2.2 (MNL with interactions) results for varying levels of
affordability, averting behaviors, and education (see Table 2.6). Only differences in
affordability led to large differences in MWTP.11 Those with affordability higher than
90% of respondents were willing to pay more than twice as much as those with
affordability higher than only 10% of respondents.
The individual differences or the combination of group-wise and individual
differences of MWTP are reflected by the distributions of individual-specific MWTP in
the RPL models (Models 2.3 and 2.4.2) (see Table 2.7). A potential issue of estimating
individual-specific MWTP through

is that any small value of

can lead to an

unrealisticly large MWTP at the end of the distribution and exaggrate the average
11

Table 6 does not report results for varying levels of averting behaviors or education. Results available
upon request.
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individual-specific MWTP (Scarpa, Thiene, and Train 2008). However, 3% of
respondents’ households can afford an increase of more than 1,500 yuan in food
expenditure, while only 1% of respondents’ MWTP for Management is more than 2,000
yuan (which is much higher than other policy changes). The magnitude of estimated
individual-specific MWTP in this study is fairly reasonable, which can support the use of
for individual-specific MWTP estimation.
In this sample, all else equal, the majority of respondents did not like the status
quo (as shown by the negative individual-specific MWTPs), and supported changes in
food safety attributes (as shown by the positive individual-specific MWTPs). Those
attitudes were consistent with the finding from the population mean MWTP values.
Notably, more than 5% of respondents had negative individual-specific MWTPs for
Management and CentralizedWeb.
Preferences were most diverse towards Management, with a higher proportion of
more negative values at the lower ends of individual-specific MWTP distributions (see
Figure 2.2a and Table 2.7). Since the marginal utility of Cost tended to have small
variation across respondents with only 1% positive values in Model 2.4.2, the higher
proportion of more negative individual-specific MWTPs indicates that a larger share of
respondents were more opposed to Management than other policy changes. Even though
a smaller share of respondents supported Management, the high individual-specific
MWTPs from its supporters offset the negative values and brought up the overall
individual-specific MWTPs for Management.
On the other hand, respondents’ attitudes towards Traceability and NGO tended to
be less diverse. The majority of individual-specific MWTPs for Traceability and NGO
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were smaller than Management. But Traceability and NGO had a larger share of
supporters (see Figures 2.2b and 2.2c and Table 2.7), especially in Model 2.4.2 where the
percentage of supporters was more than 95% for both attributes - more than 5% higher
than Management.
Ideally, the proportion of positive individual-specific MWTPs for non-cost
attributes should be at least roughly consistent with the claimed attitude towards them
(see Table 2.2). This is true for Traceability in the best fitting model (Model 2.4.2),
which provides some evidence of robustness for the distribution of individual-specific
MWTP for Traceability. However, the individual-specific MWTPs and claimed attitude
were not very consistent for Management and NGO. Some respondents claimed that they
were supportive of Management but had negative individual-specific MWTPs for it while
some respondents claimed that they were not supportive of NGO but had positive
individual-specific MWTPs for it. One possible reason for the inconsistency is that
answers for attitude questions are more subjective and the standard can vary across
respondents. Their claimed supportive and trust level may not exactly reflect their choice
of plans. Another possible reason is that some respondents were supportive of
Management but do not want to pay for it, while some other respondents more or less did
not trust NGOs but were still willing to give them a try given the cost.
Overall, the MWTPs for each non-cost attribute varied across groups of
respondents and individual respondents. The mean MWTPs suggest that the average
parents were willing to provide higher financial support for regulatory policies such as
Management and Traceability. But the individual-specific MWTP distributions in the
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RPL models indicate high levels of support for implementing Traceability and NGO,
even though the MWTPs for those policies were not as large as Management.
To test the quality of my design, I follow the process suggested in Scarpa and
Rose (2008) and calculate the ratio of the D-error of the original design and the D-error
of the design that would be generated using the estimated s. This ratio is equal to 0.81.12

2.5 Conclusion and Discussion
Food safety is crucial to human health and lives. In previous studies, Chinese
consumers have demonstrated that on average they were willing to pay a small amount of
money to improve the safety of certain food items such as milk and pork (Ortega, Wang,
Wu, et al. 2011; Bai, Zhang, and Jiang 2013). But the overall food safety situation in
China is challenging and needs to be improved by effective food safety policies that
target all food items. Previous studies that only focus on one food or one category of food
can only provide limited information for designing policies to improve food safety.
Analysis that only studies the mean MWTPs may miss identifying lower-valued policies
that nonetheless have wide support.
In this study, I focused on the marginal willingness-to-pay for policies that target
overall food safety, including regulatory policies, information policies, and third-party
policies. My estimates of the mean MWTPs provide the amount that consumers with the
median levels of affordability per person, number of averting behaviors and education
were willing to pay per month, in terms of food expenditures, in support of these policies.
Regulatory policies had a higher mean MWTP. However, examining the distributions of

12

To make this calculation, I used the estimated s from the MNL results (Model 1) , excluding the ASC.
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individual-specific MWTP reveals that while third-party policy had smaller mean
MWTPs, there was very little opposition to this policy among my respondents.
Our results suggest that the appropriate policy choice depends on the goal of
policy makers and must be weighed against the marginal costs of implementing the
competiting policies. If policy makers want to maximize financial support from parents, it
may be better to implement regulatory policies such as Management and Traceability
since those policies had higher MWTPs. But if policy makers want to consider the
welfare of advocates and obtain more supporters of the policy, it may be better to
implement Traceability and NGO, which had a larger share of respondents with positive
individual-specific MWTPs. Traceability may be a good choice among the four proposed
policy changes since it had both relatively a larger average amount of MWTP and a
relatively larger share of supporters.
It is reasonable that Traceability had strong support from respondents since the
mix of regulatory and information leaves respondents some choices. If they want to use
the information from the traceability systems, the information can help them to choose
more reliable food sources. If they do not want to use the information, they can still
benefit from the government use of the traceability system.
The traceability system is still under-developed and food safety management
systems still have a low adoption rate in China due to a lack of incentives and financial
support. But the MWTPs estimated in this study for increasing the share of traceable food
in the market and requiring of implementation of a food safety management system
suggest that a possible solution to these issues exist.
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NGOs still have a relatively small influence in China. But reliable and well
organized food NGOs can be more independent, specialized, and efficient compared to
the government (Yang 2014). Given that only a relatively small proportion of parents
trusted NGOs but the majority of parents were willing to pay for routine supplemental
food safety inspections by NGOs, policy makers may wish to consider new policies that
work to increase the credibility of NGOs and cooperate with NGOs to improve food
safety.
Even though parents were less supportive of having food safety inspection results
published on a centralized website, it is important to provide consumers such information
in a convenient way. After all, the decrease of demand for unsafe brands of food may be
one of the best incentives for food producers to produce safe food.
For the future work, it would be useful to incoporate the estimated MWTPs into a
cost-benefit analysis for the four policy changes. Given the heterogenous preferences for
each policy change across respondents, there is a potential to design food safety policies
that takes affordability and other preferences drivers into consideration so that the chosen
policy can satisfy more consumers.
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Table 2.1 Survey attributes
Attribute
Management

Traceability
CentralizedWeb

NGO

Cost
a
b

Description
Whether the government should
require food producers to implement a
food safety management system.
The percentage of traceable food in
the market
Whether the government should
publish all food inspection results on
a centralized governmental website.
Whether NGOs that focus on food
safety should provide routine
supplemental food safety inspection.
The amount of increase in monthly
household food expenditure in yuan b

Status quo levels are in bold.
At the time of the survey, 1 yuan = 0.16 US dollar
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Levela
No, Yes

Less than 1%, 10%
No, Yes

No, Yes

0, 25, 100, 200, 300,
400, 500, 600, 700,
800, 1000, 1200, 1500

Among plan A, plan B and status quo, which one would you choose? (“√”one)
Attributes
Plan A
Plan B

① Whether the government should require
food producers to implement a food safety
management system.
② The percentage of traceable food in the
market

③ Whether the government should publish
all food inspection results on a centralized
governmental website.
④ Whether NGOs that focus on food safety
should provide routine supplemental food
safety inspection.

⑤ The amount of increase in monthly
household food expenditure

I would choose

Yes

No

No

10%

Less than
1%

Less than
1%

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

300 yuan

1000 yuan

No change

A

B

M

Figure 2.1 Sample choice set
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Status quo

Table 2.2 Summary statistics of selected variables
Variable name
Affordability
Averting
Education
Foodexp
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Variable description
Affordable increase in food expenditure per person centered at median
level of 150 yuan (in 100 yuan). b
Number of averting behaviors centered to the median level of 3 behaviors.c

Obsa
4540

Mean
0.20

Std.
Dev
1.20

Min
-1.50

Max
6

4532

0.03

1.40

-3

4

Number of years of education centered to the median level of 12 years
education.d
Monthly household food expenditure (in 100 yuan) e

4540

1.20

2.60

-12

9

4536

17.14

6.12

2.50
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0.01
0.24
0.39
0.36

0.11
0.43
0.49
0.48

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

0.02
0.07
0.21
0.71

0.12
0.25
0.41
0.46

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

0.02
0.08
0.23
0.66

0.15
0.28
0.42
0.47

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

0.07
0.27
0.39

0.26
0.44
0.49

0
0
0

1
1
1

Concern about current food safety situation in Hunan province
Concern1
Not at all concerned
4540
Concern2
Somewhat concerned
4540
Concern3
Fairly concerned
4540
Concern4
Very concerned
4540
Support for government requirement that food producers implement a food safety management system
Supportm1
Not at all supportive
4524
Supportm2
Somewhat supportive
4524
Supportm3
Fairly supportive
4524
Supportm4
Very supportive
4524
Support increasing traceable food from current level of less than 1% to 10%
Supportt1
Not at all supportive
4540
Supportt2
Somewhat supportive
4540
Supportt3
Fairly supportive
4540
Supportt4
Very supportive
4540
Trust of NGOs
TrustNGO1
Don’t trust at all
4532
TrustNGO2
Somewhat not trust
4532
TrustNGO3
Neutral
4532

TrustNGO4
Somewhat trust
4532
0.24
0.43
0
1
TrustNGO5
Very trusting
4532
0.03
0.16
0
1
a
Obs is the number of CE questions.
b
At the time of the survey, 1 yuan= 0.16 US dollar.
c
Averting behaviors in this study include avoiding food with high safety risks, only choosing brands they trust, using tricks to choose relatively safer
food, making processed food such as soy milk at home, growing vegetables or raising poultry by themselves, getting agricultural products from their
farmer relatives, purchasing imported foods, and others.
d
To simplify the model, I convert the categorical education level into a continuous variable by calculating years of education. In China, it is standard to
finish elementary school in six years, junior high school in three years and senior high school in three years. In most cases, people finish junior college
in three years, college in four years, and master programs in two years. People need a master degree before entering a PhD program. I assume that it
takes them three years to finish a PhD program.
e
Since the food expenditure data gathered through my survey is categorical, I use the lower bound of the highest category and the middle point of other
categories as the food expenditure for each respondent.
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Table 2.3 Comparison between sample and city population
Sample
City Population
Changsha
Huaihua
Changsha
Huaihua
Annual food expenditure per
[4896,6467]
[4361, 5881]
7366
4446
a,b,c
capita
Years of education d
13.0
13.5
12.5
8.5
a
Since the food expenditure data gathered through my survey is categorical, I use the lower and
higher bounds of each category to calculate the lowest and highest possible average per capita food
expenditure, which is the range in sample.
b
Population data source: Statistical Bureau of Hunan Province
c
Since Hunan Statistical Yearbook 2014 does not include food expenditure data from 2013, I use
food expenditure data from 2012 with adjustment of inflation.
d
Population years of education in Huaihua is 2010 data.
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Table 2.4 Model estimates
Model 1

Coefficient
(SE)

Model 2
MNL with
interactions
Coefficient
(SE)
0.871***
(0.056)
0.510***
(0.048)
0.295***
(0.053)
0.543***
(0.050)
-0.470***
(0.013)
-0.665***
(0.080)
0.115***
(0.008)
-0.350***
(0.082)
-0.108***
(0.037)
-0.081***
(0.020)
Coefficient
(SE)

Number of CE
questions

4540

4532

4540

4532

4532

Number of respondents

1185

1183

1185

1183

1183

Log likelihood

-3693

-3256

-3335

-3010

-3011

AIC per respondent

6.243

5.521

5.648

5.123

5.117

5.250

5.218

Variable
Management
Traceability
CentralizedWeb
NGO
Costsa
ASC_sq

MNL
Coefficient
(SE)
0.865***
(0.054)
0.510***
(0.046)
0.285***
(0.051)
0.516***
(0.049)
-0.374***
(0.012)
-0.508***
(0.069)

Cost*affordabilitya
ASC_sq*affordabilitya
ASC_sq*averting
ASC_sq*edu

SD
Management
Traceability
CentralizedWeb
NGO
Costsa
ASC_sq

Model 3
RPL normal
Coefficient
(SE)
1.601***
(0.145)
1.124***
(0.118)
0.685***
(0.116)
0.939***
(0.107)
-0.944***
(0.059)
-1.611***
(0.154)

Coefficient
(SE)
2.470***
(0.229)
1.419***
(0.206)
1.965***
(0.198)
1.177***
(0.216)
0.376***
(0.034)
1.584***
(0.171)

Cost*affordabilitya
ASC_sq*affordabilitya
ASC_sq*averting
ASC_sq*edu

BIC per respondent
6.281
5.584
5.725
a
Costs and affordability are original values from choice sets divided by 100.
b
“***” is significant at less than 1% level. “**” is significant at less than 5% level.
c
Standard errors are corrected for panel effects
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Model 4.1

Model 4.2

RPL normal with interactions
Coefficient
Coefficient
(SE)
(SE)
1.367***
1.356***
(0.111)
(0.108)
0.940***
0.944***
(0.095)
(0.094)
0.551***
0.541***
(0.096)
(0.093)
0.851***
0.845***
(0.088)
(0.087)
-0.830***
-0.821***
(0.047)
(0.044)
-1.529***
-1.525***
(0.137)
(0.134)
0.246***
0.243***
(0.022)
(0.020)
-0.687***
-0.737***
(0.121)
(0.119)
-0.160***
-0.160**
(0.056)
(0.053)
-0.075**
-0.076**
(0.030)
(0.030)
Coefficient
Coefficient
(SE)
(SE)
1.680***
1.666***
(0.169)
(0.166)
1.000***
1.000***
(0.178)
(0.161)
1.496***
1.465***
(0.147)
(0.142)
-0.749***
0.728***
(0.209)
(0.199)
0.022
(0.056)
-0.243
(0.329)
0.102***
0.099***
(0.022)
(0.019)
1.611***
1.663***
(0.209)
(0.149)
0.283
(0.318)
0.0003
(0.115)

Table 2.5 Monthly mean MWTPs (in yuan) for changes in food safety attributes
Model 2.4.2 RPL
Model 2.3 RPL
normal

normal with
interactions

MWTP
(CIa)

Model 2.2 MNL
with interactions
MWTP for
representative
respondentsb
(CIa)

MWTP
(CIa)

MWTP for
representative
respondentsb
(CIa)

The government should require food producers to
implement a food safety management system.

232
(206, 256)

185
(164, 206)

169
(146, 194)

165
(144, 186)

The percentage of traceable food in the market
increases to 10% from less than 1%.

136
(112, 160)

108
(88, 128)

119
(98, 140)

115
(95, 134)

The government should publish food safety inspection
results on a centralized website.

76
(52, 102)

63
(43, 84)

73
(50, 96)

66
(45, 87)

NGOs that focus on food safety should provide routine
supplemental food safety inspections.

138
(114, 163)

115
(95, 136)

99
(80, 120)

103
(85, 122)

-136
(-168, -105)

-141
(-169, -115)

-170
(-196, -146)

-186
(-211, -161)

Model 2.1 MNL
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Maintain the status quo, all else held constant
a

95% Krinsky-Robb CI
The representative respondents are respondents with a median level of affordability per person (150 yuan), median number of averting behaviors
(3), and median education level (12 years).
b

Figure 2.2 Individual-specific MWTP
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Table 2.6 Monthly MWTPs for changes in non-cost attributes and status quo in yuan under
different scenarios in Model 2.2: MNL with interactions
MWTP of
MWTP of
respondents with respondents with
MWTP of the
affordability
affordability
representative
higher than 10% higher than 90%
Changes
respondent a
of respondents b,c of respondents c,d
The government should require food
185
146
334
producers to implement a food safety
management system.
The percentage of traceable food in
the market increases to 10% from less
than 1%.

108

86

196

The government should publish food
safety inspection results on a
centralized website.

63

49

113

NGOs that focus on food safety
should provide routine supplemental
food safety inspections.

115

91

209

Maintain the status quo, all else held
-141
-47
-501
constant
a
The representative respondents had median level of affordability per person (150 yuan), averting
behaviors (3) and education level (12 years/high school)
b
Assumes have median level of averting behaviors and education level.
c
Centered affordability is -110 yuan.
d
Centered affordability is 183 yuan.
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Table 2.7 Monthly individual-specific MWTPs for changes in food policy attributes and ASC_sq in yuan by percentiles
1%

5%

10%

25%

50%
(Median)

75%

90%

95%

99%

The government should require food producers to implement a food safety management system.

-255

-126

-83

47

165

306

505

685

1011

The percentage of traceable food in the market increases to 10% from less than 1%.

-84

-5

27

74

109

164

268

355

655

The government should publish food safety inspection results on a centralized website.

-344

-147

-86

-3

74

139

297

382

725

NGOs that focus on food safety should provide routine supplemental food safety inspections.

-34

6

25

60

88

151

207

284

633

Maintain the status quo, all else held constant

-729

-463

-359

-247

-174

-109

-36

5

68

The government should require food producers to implement a food safety management system.

-675

-53

-10

73

165

272

442

640

2083

The percentage of traceable food in the market increases to 10% from less than 1%.

-417

22

46

79

110

154

241

379

991

The government should publish food safety inspection results on a centralized website.

-425

-117

-75

4

69

126

260

370

872

NGOs that focus on food safety should provide routine supplemental food safety inspections.

-351

46

58

78

98

139

208

323

785

Maintain the status quo, all else held constant

-4986

-1251

-610

-260

-193

-132

-7

111

2316

Model 2.3: RPL normal

Model 2.4.2: RPL normal with interactions
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The grey area on the left side has negative MWTPs for attributes. The grey area on the right side has positive MWTPs for the status quo.

CHAPTER 3: Cost or the Promise of Safety: Chinese Parents’ Milk Choices

3.1 Introduction
The tradeoff between money and health/life risks is a common issue in our lives.
For instance, people can choose between riskier jobs with higher wages and less risky
jobs with lower wages, or between a high cost/low health risk living location and a low
cost/high health risk living location, and expensive/safer food/water or cheaper/less safe
food/water (Viscusi 1993; Viscusi, Magat, and Huber 1991; Grunert 2005; Andersson,
Hole, and Svensson 2016). Different expected utility from money and health/life risks
can lead to the choice of different money-risks combinations (Viscusi 1993). But the
choice becomes more difficult when health/life risks are not necessarily reduced after
money is paid, due to information asymmetry in the market. In this study, I examine
Chinese parents’ choice of milk for their children to investigate the general issue of
tradeoffs when there is uncertainty about the level of health/life risks.
The “lemons principle” suggests that when information asymmetry exits and
buyers cannot distinguish quality used cars from “lemons”, they end up purchasing the
lemons with lower prices and eventually drive quality used cars out of the market
(Akerlof 1970). This is because the quality and price tend to be more consistent for the
lemons than quality cars. Sellers are less likely to sell quality cars at the lower price level
of the lemons, but are more likely to claim that a lemon is a quality car and sell a lemon
at the higher price level of a quality car for more profit.
Empirical evidence for the existence of the lemons principle has been found in the
used vehicle market, as well as the child care and coin markets (Bond 1984; Huston and
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Spencer 2002; Mocan 2007). But some other markets do not follow the lemons principle
due to their unique characteristics. These markets include but are not limited to the
educational service market when schools can select students (buyers), the wholesale
cherry market where buyers figure out signals to identify quality cherries, and eBay with
its reputation system (MacLeod and Urquiola 2009; Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002;
Rosenman and Wilson 1991).
It is not clear whether markets whose products differ in their safety levels rather
than quality will follow the lemons principle. But in the Chinese milk market between
2004 and 2013, a series of safety incidents involving milk and milk products created a
market with similar conditions described in the lemons principle: both high-quality (safe)
and low-quality (unsafe) products exist but the actual safety levels are unknown to
consumers. 13 This market allows me to explore people’s tradeoff between money and
health risks in an asymmetric information framework.
I conducted an anonymous valuation and attitudinal survey about food safety
issues among urban parents of elementary-aged in two cities of China’s Hunan province.
I simulated the lemons principle by asking parents to choose between two hypothetical
brands of milk for their children in Chinese milk market at the time of survey: Brand A
has a lower price with no safety claim while Brand B has a higher price and is claimed to
be safe by the producer.
A previous study found that consumers’ mistrust of quality claims can lead to
market failure in a food market as described in the lemons principle (Hennessy, Roosen,

13

In those incidents, a variety of contaminants were found in milk products, including biological
contaminations such as aflatoxin 140% higher than the food safety standard, and chemical contaminations
from inedible additives such as melamine and leather-hydrolyzed protein. These contaminants can pose
risks such as liver damage, heavy metal poisoning, cancer , and even death (J. Zhang 2011; Yau 2012).
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and Jensen 2003). But when the food differs in terms of safety level rather than quality,
my survey data reveals a different outcome than the one predicted by the lemons
principle. For a question about parents’ hypothetical choice of milk for their children,
80% of parents made an anti-lemons choice and chose the more expensive product with a
safety claim (Brand B). The remaining 20 percent of parents chose the cheaper brand
with no safety claim (Brand A). Therefore, my data suggests two important results. First,
parents had heterogeneous preferences. Second, majority of parents made an anti-lemons
choice.
This survey result is consistent with findings from previous studies: consumers
were willing to pay more for milk with safety-related certifications and traceability
(Ortega, Wang, Olynk, et al. 2011; Bai, Zhang, and Jiang 2013). It is also consistent with
consumers’ actual purchasing behavior: Chinese imports of milk and milk products have
increased rapidly since 2008 and almost tripled between 2008 and 2013 (FAO 2014),
given that consumers perceive imported milk to be safer.
Unlike the choice of lemons, the anti-lemon choice in my survey seems to prevent
expensive safe products from being driven out of the market by cheap unsafe products.
But in a market with information asymmetry, anti-lemon choice can cause a greater issue
than the choice of lemons. The choice of lemons at least ensures the consistency between
price and safety for products in the market, even though they are unsafe. The anti-lemon
choice with information asymmetry provides producers both incentive and opportunity to
sell unsafe products at higher prices by claiming they are safe. Market failure still exists
with unsafe products in the market. But consumers can end up paying more for unsafe
products that are claimed to be safe, compared to the choice of lemons.
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Therefore, I need to further explore factors that influence parents’ choice of milk
to investigate the reason that the majority of Chinese parents made an anti-lemons choice.
A better understanding of their choice can help policymakers obtain insight on market
failure and implement policies to improve consumers’ welfare. It can also help producers
to find the best production strategies.
In this study, I empirically investigate factors that influence individual parent’s
milk choice using the unique survey data mentioned previously. I find that parents were
more likely to choose Brand B with lower price and higher perceived safety level of
Brand B. But I also find that the majority parents who somewhat did not trust the safety
claim of Brand B chose Brand B, which seems irrational. I develop a theoretical model to
explore parents’ concerns in milk market and how milk price, safety level, and parents’
risk aversion to the inconsistency between milk price and safety can jointly influence
parents’ choice of milk. I find that health concern provides parents the incentive to make
an anti-lemon choice and may explain their seemingly irrational choice.

3.2 Model of Milk Choice by Individual Parent
The lemons principle focuses on choice at the aggregate level, without
considering individual difference. However, people with different characteristics can
have heterogeneous preferences. To capture influential factors on people’s preferences
and better understand the milk choice among parents, it is necessary to first model one
parent’s choice of milk.
When a parent chooses between two brands of milk, he/she compares the utility
from each brand and chooses the one with higher utility. The utility from each brand of
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milk is determined by a utility maximization problem with constrained resources. In my
study, each household’s choice of milk may lead to different health status for children,
which directly influences household utility. Therefore, this utility maximization problem
should incorporate a household production function of health component for children
(Becker 1965; Huffman 2011; Kutty 2008).
Assume household utility
consumption of a brand of milk

depends on the child’s current health status
, the consumption of other nutrition

, the
, the

consumption of non-food goods (excluding medical care) , and parents’ leisure .
the child’s initial health status.

is

is a vector of other factors such as demographic

variables. The utility function of a household is specified as

which is assumed to be strictly concave. I assume

is the safety level of a brand of milk.

A higher safety level means the brand has a higher probability to be safe and vise versa.
is the medical care for the child.

is all the unobservable factors that influence the

production of the child’s health. The household production function for the child’s health
is specified as

which is also assumed to be strictly concave. Moreover, I assume

,

,

and

are

the prices of milk, other nutrition, medical care and non-food goods (excluding medical
care), respectively.

is hours of work and

is wage.

is non-labor income.

is the

total amount of time the parents have. The utility maximization problem for a household
can be written as
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After solving the optimization problem, the indirect utility function can be written as

which depends on prices, the wage and non-labor income, the safety level of milk, the
initial health status of the child, and other observed and unobserved factors.
A linear function form of the indirect utility function (1) for respondent
brand

(

with

A or B) can be written as the following:

where

represents milk price

level .

represents wage

prices of other nutrition

and non-labor income

, medical care

represents child’s initial health status
as demographics.

in equation (1).

.

represents safety
.

and non-food goods

represents
.

represents other factors

such

is a random component which represents all unobserved factors that

influence utility and is assumed to follow an extreme value distribution.
Respondent
(
respondent

chooses Brand B over Brand A if Brand B brings a higher utility

). Given the assumed distribution of the error term, the probability of
choosing the expensive Brand B with a safety claim is

Therefore, the empirical model to explore parents’ choice of milk can be written as
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In the next section, I will discuss details of the survey mentioned previously. I
will also discuss variables and data that can be used in the empirical model to explore
how potential influential factors can lead to the choice of Brand B.

3.3 Survey and Data
3.3.1 Survey Implementation
The data I use for the empirical model is collected from an anonymous valuation
and attitudinal survey about food safety issues in China. I targeted urban parents of young
children (approximately six and seven years old) in this survey because urban children
are more likely to consume milk and be exposed to safety risks. Young children are also
more vulnerable to safety risks. Therefore, their consumption of milk can have a larger
impact in the market. They can also benefit more from the effective policies that ensure
milk safety.
I randomly selected eight elementary schools from the two cities (Changsha and
Huaihua) in Hunan province. The survey was implemented among parents of first- and
second-year students.14 I sent out 1,385 hard copies of the Chinese-version of the survey
to parents via their children. Children were asked to return the completed surveys at their

14

I did not focus on younger children from daycare or preschools because elementary school is free and
mandatory, resulting in almost a 100% enrollment rate. In contrast, daycare/preschool is optional and
parents must cover the cost. Thus, elementary school provides a more representative sample of households.
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schools within two days. As this was an IRB-approved anonymous survey, parents were
only contacted once. I received 1,205 responses, resulting in a response rate of 87%.
After excluding respondents whose children did not drink milk and respondents with
missing values, I have 1143 observations.
It is difficult to test the representativeness of this sample because there is no
available demographic information for urban parents of elementary students in first and
second year. I can only present a comparison between all residents of Changsha and
Huaihua and my sample (see Table 3.2). Since the food expenditure data gathered
through my survey is categorical, I use the lower and higher bounds of each category to
calculate the lowest and highest possible average per capita food expenditure. The
possible range of per capita food expenditure in my sample is lower than the population
per capita food expenditure in Changsha. But the possible range of food expenditure per
capita in my sample included the population per capita food expenditure in Huaihua.
Therefore, my sample has lower per capita food expenditure in Changsha and comparable
per capita food expenditure in Huaihua. Respondents in my sample also tend to have
higher education than the population. One reason may be that my respondents are
younger and have mostly finished their school.

3.3.2 Survey Instrument
The survey development process included focus group discussions, individual
interviews, and a pretest. The final questionnaire consisted of four sections and a total of
33 questions, which took approximately 20 minutes to complete. Twenty of those
questions are relevant to this study, which inquires parents’ attitudes, knowledge and
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experiences with food safety issues, behaviors related to food choices, and demographic
information (see Chapter 2 for more details about the survey).
This survey has four versions that differ in one question. Each school received a
relatively equal number of surveys for each version. In this question, the choice in the
“lemons principle” is simulated by providing two brands of milk for parents to choose for
their children (see Figure 3.1 for a sample question). Parental choice becomes the
dependent variable ChoseBrandB in the empirical model. Brand A is always 3 yuan per
250ml, which was the common price of milk in grocery stores. Brand B has different
prices MilkPrice (6, 9, 12 or 15 yuan per 250ml) in different versions of the survey and is
claimed to be safe by its producer (see Figure 3.1).15
In reality, both the actual safety level of milk and the chance of milk being safe
may be unknown to consumers. But their perceived safety level can influence their choice
(Grunert 2005). Therefore, after parents chose between milk brands A and B in the
survey, a follow-up question asks how much they trusted the claim by the producer that
Brand B was safe (TrustLevelClaim), within five categories from “not at all trust” to
“very trusting”. In reality, parents know neither the true safety level of milk nor the
probability of milk being safe in this case. This trust level can be used to measure the
perceived safety level of Brand B and represent MilkSafety in equation (2).16 Parents also
stated whether or not they consider the price as the most important characteristics to
identify safe food (PriceImportant). The purpose of this question is to obtain additional
information on parents’ opinion to the relationship between price and safety.

15
16

15 yuan was the highest price I can find in the market at the time of the survey.
The trust level of milk is the expected value of perceived safety level of brand B for the model in section

6.
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This survey includes several questions relevant to TotalIncome in equation (2).
Food expenditure and household size are collected to calculate food expenditure per
capita (FoodExp). Per capita food expenditure provides an approximation of wage and
non-labor income as wage and non-labor income are sensitive information that
potentially would lead to fewer responses. The highest affordable increase in food
expenditure (AffordableExp) and what other spending had to decrease if food became
more expensive (DecreaseExp) reflect budget constraints that may influence the milk
choice. The frequency of milk consumption (MilkFrequency) can also influence the
financial situation of a household.
It is difficult to find detailed information about prices of non-milk goods and
services, OtherPrices in equation (2). But school attended (School) provides an indicator
for respondent location. Price levels in the same area tend to be similar but vary over
locations. Different types of markets for grocery shopping (ShoppingLocation), such as
supermarket and wet market, can also capture price differences. However, data on the
initial health status of children is not available from the survey.
OtherFactors in equation (2) can include variables discussed and/or used in
previous studies on risk, food safety and food choice, such as food safety concern, mass
media, food safety knowledge, previous experience, and demographics such as gender
(Male), Age, and Education (Sitkin and Pablo 1992; Baker 2003; Wilcock et al. 2004;
Reilly 2006; Schroeder et al. 2007). I will discuss specific variables included in
OtherFactors in the next few paragraphs.
Parents provided some information that can reflect their concern towards food
safety in both subjective and objective ways. The information includes a stated concern
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level towards current food safety situation (ConcernLevel), whether their grocery stores
or wet market publish food safety inspection results (StorePublication), how frequently
they used mass media to check food safety (CheckSafetyInfo), and what and how many of
their averting behaviors to avoid unsafe food were (Averting).
The influence of mass media can be reflected through whether parents heard any
recent news on the food safety incidents that are provided in a survey question. The
incidents were separated into two variables that represent the ones in and outside of
Hunan province (NumLocalNews and NonLocalNews) because their influence may be
different. Incidents closers to parents may have larger influences on their attitude towards
food safety.
Parental knowledge of food safety management systems and food labels
(Knowledge) is measured through their stated familiarity of those systems and labels.
Those systems and labels can provide safety information of food. Parents may also obtain
more safety information if they have friends or relatives work in food industry
(FoodJob).
Consumer’s previous experiences of dealing with food safety and quality issues
(Experience) may influence their attitudes. This variable of previous experiences includes
two parts of information. One is whether consumers took actions and the other one is how
much time they spent and whether they are satisfied with the results if they took actions.
Those who took actions and achieved satisfactory results with less time may be more
optimistic about food safety and be less concerned about health risks compared to others.
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3.3.3 Variables and Data
Fifty-six variables are generated from those survey questions (see Table 3.1 for
definitions and descriptive statistics of variables). I received a relatively equal number of
responses from each version of survey. According to the summary statistics of variables
in Table 3.1, the majority of children drank milk almost every day. This confirms that
milk is an important food in children’s diets and it is crucial to understanding parents’
choices of milk for policies to improve milk safety.
80% of respondents preferred Brand B (with a higher price and safety claim) as
discussed previously. This is reasonable given that majority of respondents had heard
recent news on food safety issues, especially on local issues. The fact that the majority
chose Brand B is also reasonable given that 99% of respondents indicated they were more
or less concerned about current food safety in Hunan province. The difference of safety
levels tends to dominate the difference of price in this case.
Only 1% of respondents considered price as one of the most important
characteristics to identify safe food. Many respondents probably realized that expensive
milk was not necessarily safe milk. But even though the safety claim of Brand B was not
completely reliable, only 25% of respondents completely or somewhat did not trust it.
Respondents put significant effort in improving the safety of food they consumed.
They had an average of three averting behaviors to avoid unsafe food. It was common for
them to use mass media to check safety information of food. 74% of respondents had
experience taking actions to deal with food that has quality or safety issues, although
many felt they spent too much time and energy without getting a satisfactory result.
However, as important information to prevent unsafe food, respondents were not very
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familiar with food safety management systems and food labels, with only an average
knowledge index of 4 out of 7.
Respondents averaged 37 of age and 13 years of education. 60% of respondents
were female. This may because female are more involved in food decisions and grocery
shopping in China. 38% of respondents had friends or relatives with a food related job.
On average, the monthly food expenditure was 449 Chinese yuan per capita, and survey
respondents thought they could afford a maximum increase of 167 Chinese yuan per
capita on food, which was more likely to result in a cut in expenditure on leisure rather
than saving and other expenditures.17

3.4 Marginal Effect of Influential Factors for Milk Choice
Even though my survey contains many potentially relevant variables,
some of them are not explicitly suggested as independent variables by the theoretical
model. The full model that contains all available variables is not necessarily the best
fitting model for the data. To select a best fitting model, I use a stepwise model selection
method to compare the AIC of multiple models that drop one variable at a time (Venables
and Ripley 2002). The model with the lowest AIC is considered as the best fit. Table 3.3
presents the regression result of the full model (Model 1) and a selected model (Model
2).18 The likelihood ratio test shows that the difference in fit between Models 1 and 2 is
not significant; thus, the more restrictive model, Model 2, is the preferred model for this

17

At the time of the survey, 1 yuan= 0.16 US dollar.
Several variables are categorical variables. I create a dummy variable for each category. However,
stepwise model selection method does not always select dummy variables of all categories for a categorical
variable. In order to include full information from a categorical variable, if the dummy variable of at least
one category is selected, I force the dummy variable of all categories of a categorical variable in Model 2.
18
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study. Also, the Hosmer-Lemeshow chi-square test with 10 groups does not reject the
null hypothesis that Model 2 is a good fit.
The marginal effect of independent variables on the probability of choosing Brand
B is also presented in Table 3.3, in order to understand the influential factors for the
choice of milk. The more a parent trusted the safety claim, the more likely he/she chose
Brand B that has a safety claim. Compared to those who were neutral to the safety claim,
parents who did not trust the safety claim at all had a 50% lower probability of choosing
Brand B, while parents who were very trusting of the safety claim were 18% more likely
to choose Brand B.
The price of Brand B also had some influence. There was 6-11% less probability
of choosing Brand B when it was more expensive. However, when the price of Brand B
was relatively low, a small increase in price, such as from 6 to 9 Chinese yuan, did not
significantly influence parents’ choice.
An increase of food expenditure per capita by one yuan led to a less than 0.1%
higher probability of choosing Brand B. Higher food expenditures may indicate that the
household was either richer or willing to spend more on food. Therefore, Brand B was
more affordable to them and price was likely less of a concern compared to health risks.
The exposure to one more local food safety news item increased by 2% the
probability of choosing Brand B. But among the 99% parents who claimed they were
more or less concerned about the food safety situation in Hunan province, their concern
level does not significantly influence their choice of milk.
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A parent with one more averting behaviors to avoid unsafe food was more likely
to choose Brand B by 2%. Since the choice of Brand B itself can be considered as an
averting behavior, parents’ choice was consistent with their behaviors.
The previous experience of dealing with food quality and safety issues had a weak
influence on parents’ choice. Compared to those who did not take any actions, parents
with a positive experience (where they spent small amount of time and energy and got
satisfactory results) were 5% less likely to choose Brand B (15% significance level). This
may because parents with a positive experience had more confidence in their ability to
solve safety issues if they happened, while other parents tried to avoid those issues
through the choice of Brand B.

3.5 Aggregate Milk Choice by Prices and Perceived Safety Levels
The lemons principle focuses on qualitative analysis of people’s choices
considering the inconsistency, which is the joint effect, of quality and price of products. It
only assumes high and low levels of quality and price, and does not further differentiate
various magnitudes of high or low levels.
However, the marginal effect of influential factors for milk choice in section 4
shows that holding everything else constant, both different trust levels of the safety claim
(perceived safety level) and different prices of Brand B (expensive with safety claim)
influenced parents’ choice of milk. Those differences cannot be captured by using the
pooled data to directly count the percentage of parents choosing Brand B as the lemons
principle. Therefore, I should further investigate the percentage of choosing Brand B at
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each price and perceived safety level of Brand B, after controlling other characteristics in
Model 2 (see Table 3.4).
In Table 3.4, the lower left corner represents high inconsistency between price
and perceived safety level of Brand B, while the upper right corner represents high
consistency between price and perceived safety level. The probability of choosing Brand
B increased from about 20% to 99% as the difference of perceived safety level increases
and price difference decreases. This means when the price and perceived safety level of
Brand B is highly inconsistent, parents’ choice tend to follow the lemons principle. But
when the price and perceived safety level become more consistent, the majority of
parents made an anti-lemon choice at some point. Therefore, the magnitude of
inconsistency for Brand B matters.
The turning point appears when parents somewhat did not trust the safety claim
and the price is 12 yuan or less. Those parents, as well as parents who were neutral or
trust the safety claim of Brand B at any given price, were consistently more likely to
choose Brand B. It does not seem rational to choose a brand even when parents somewhat
did not trust the safety claim of this brand. I am also curious about the reason for such
high percentage of choosing Brand B when parents were neutral about the safety claim
(70-86%).
It is worth noting that parents were significantly more likely to choose Brand B
when its price and perceived safety level are both high (lower right corner of Table 3.4
with a probability of 97%), while they were less in favor of Brand B when its price and
perceived safety level are both low (upper left corner with a probability of 38%).
Perceived safety level seems to have a more dominant effect on parents’ choice than the
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price. This may be relevant to the observation that more parents chose Brand B when
they were neutral or even somewhat did not trust the safety claim of this brand. To
address this, I build a theoretical model in the next section.

3.6 Risk Aversion to the Inconsistency of Price and Perceived Safety Level
One issue the lemons principle does not consider is people’s risk aversion to the
inconsistency of price and perceived safety level. Risk aversion may play an important
role in parents’ choice of milk in my survey due to a unique characteristic of food market.
A significant difference between food market, including milk market, and some
other markets is that food relates to health. Even though the inconsistency between price
and safety level provides an incentive to choose lemons, the inconsistency is not the only
concern when health is involved. Cheap milk may in fact be more likely to have a greater
safety risk. Health concerns can cause parents to make an anti-lemons choice for more
expensive but possible safer milk. Therefore, parents may need to weigh the
inconsistency concern and the health concern in making their milk choice.
The influence of health concern can be reflected by parents’ risk aversion to the
inconsistency between milk price and safety. If parents put more weight on health
concern (health lovers), then they care less about the inconsistency and prefer possible
safer products. Therefore, they are risk seekers. If parents put more weight on the
inconsistency concern (consistency lovers), then they are risk averters.
To understand the influence of risk aversion, I need go back to individual parent’s
choice first. The price and perceived safety level of Brand B do not vary for an individual
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parent. Therefore, I assume there are two prices, high price
safety levels, high safety level

and low safety level

Brand A has the low price

and low price

, and two

for brands A and B.

. Brand A is likely to have the low safety level

,

which matches its low price. This is because the producer does not have incentive to
charge a low price for milk with high safety level due to the additional cost to ensuring
safety.
Brand B has the high price

. It is reasonable to believe that the producer may

over-price unsafe milk and make more profit when there is a lack of supervision on the
production of milk. Asymmetric information between producers and consumers creates
uncertainty about whether Brand B has the high safety level that matches its high price
for consumers. Therefore, I assume a probability
, and a probability of

that Brand B has the high safety level

that Brand B has the low safety level

Assume an inconsistency index

.

can capture the joint influence of milk

price and safety level on utility in the model for the discussion of individual milk choice.
Utility should increase with the index
decrease with the index

when a brand of milk is safer and

when this brand of milk is more expensive.

can have many formats. Without losing generality, one possibility is for
the index

to be the ratio of safety level and milk price (

). To include this

inconsistency index in utility function (1), I can rewrite the utility function as

Therefore, utility depends on the ratio of safety level and milk price, all prices, the
wage and non-labor income, the initial health status of the child, and other factors. A
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smaller value of

indicates less consistency between price and safety. Since parents are

always opposed to inconsistency between price and safety,
. Therefore,

,

, and

is an increasing function of

.

The indirect utility function of a parent choosing Brand A is

and the expected indirect utility function of a parent choosing Brand B is

where

is

the

probability

of

Brand

B

having

high

safety

level.

is the utility from Brand B with high safety
level.

is the utility from Brand B with low

safety level.

.

Parents’ choice of milk depends on the magnitude of
choose Brand B if

and

. They will

, vise versa. When a parent makes the choice between any

two given brands, many factors in the indirect utility function are the same for both
brands, such as non-milk prices

and wage

. But two factors can influence

his/her choice. The first factor is inconsistency index,
second factor is parents’ risk aversion to
Inconsistency index

, for Brands A and B. The

.

(for Brand A) is always larger than

high price and low safety level). Therefore, the utility

(for Brand B with

for Brand A is larger than

for Brand B with high price and low safety level, holding everything else constant.
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But the relationship between
level) and

(for Brand B with high price and high safety

is not determined with two possible situations. When Brand B is much more

expensive than Brand A or the safety level of Brand B is not much higher than Brand A,
and

, holding everything else constant. No matter what risk aversion a

parent has, he/she should always choose Brand A. Therefore, I will not focus on this case.
When Brand B is not much more expensive than Brand A or the safety level of
Brand B is much higher than Brand A,

and

, holding everything else

constant. A parent should compare the expected utility of Brand B,
of Brand A,
,

and

, and the utility

. His/her choice of milk depends on the risk aversion and the magnitude of
as shown in Figure 3.2. The value of inconsistency index increases towards

right, as the safety and price become more consistent.
It is worth mentioning that in my survey data, the low safety level
are fixed, but the high safety level
reflect the variation of
indices of Brand B,

and

and

and price

and price

varies across parents. Graphs that

can be complicated, give that both inconsistency

, change. However, parents’ choice should be influenced by

the relative magnitude of the high and low values, rather than the absolute magnitude.
Therefore, I fix the high safety level and price, and allow changes in the low safety level
and price in all graphs. A larger difference of prices caused by a lower price of Brand A
in the graphs is equivalent to a larger difference of prices caused by a higher price of
Brand B from the survey data. The difference of safety level is similar.
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According to previous discussion, Figure 3.2a presents the convex utility curve of
a health lover (risk seeker to the inconsistency). This parent is willing to take the risk of
inconsistency between price and safety of Brand B as long as Brand B has some chance
to be safer. Therefore, the expected utility of Brand B,

, is higher than the utility of

expected inconsistency index:

Point
equal to

is at a level of inconsistency index where the corresponding utility is
. When the inconsistency index of Brand A

Brand A

is at point , the utility of

. The health lover is indifferent between brands A and B. When

is smaller than the level at point ,

, holding everything else constant. The

health lover chooses Brand B with higher price and safety claim, vise versa.
As shown in Figure 3.2a, the point
this situation. When

is between

is always on the right side of
and point

in

, even though the expected

inconsistency level of Brand B is lower than the inconsistency level of Brand A, the
health lover still chooses Brand B due to the larger weight on health concern. He/she is
relatively tolerant of the inconsistency of Brand B.
Only when

is on the right side of point , does the health lover choose Brand

A. The inconsistency index
means the high price of Brand B

is relatively far away from

and is close to

is much larger than the low price of Brand A

difference between high safety level

and low safety level
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. This
, but

is not large enough.

Brand A with slightly lower safety level and/or much cheaper price than Brand B can be
very attractive, even the health lover with great health concern is willing to give up Brand
B.
When Brand B has a higher probability to be safer ( increases), the expected
utility of Brand B increases to

. The threshold point also increases from

to

.

Brand B becomes a better choice. Therefore, the health lover will need even higher safety
level and/or lower price of Brand A than the situation at point

to switch to Brand A.

Moreover, the health lover can be heterogeneous, which leads to different
thresholds (point

and

) to switch between brands A and B (see Figure 3.3). Figure 3.3

presents an example of a more extreme health lover and a more moderate health lover
who are both risk seekers. Both of them have the same inconsistency index

and

for

Brand B with high and low safety levels. They also have the same expected inconsistency
index

for Brand B, which means the probability of Brand B to have a high safety

level is the same. The utility curve of the extreme health lover is more convex than the
moderate one.
In Figure 3.3, the difference between the expected inconsistency index
Brand B and threshold point

for extreme health lover is larger than the difference

between

and threshold point

between

and threshold point

and

for

for a moderate health lover. A larger difference
for

in this situation means the difference between

is larger, and/or the difference between
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and

is larger (i.e. the low

safety level

is not much less than the high safety level

much less than the high price

, and/or the low price

is

).

The indication of Figure 3.3 for the two health lovers is that to make the extreme
health lover choose Brand A,

has to be larger than point

moderate health lover choose Brand A,
For

between points

, and/or the low price

only has to be larger than point

.

and , only the moderate health lover chooses Brand A.

This is because the low safety level
level

; while to make the

is not high enough comparing to the high safety

is not low enough comparing to the high price

. In

other words, the price difference does not significantly overwhelm the safety difference.
The extreme health lover does not find it worth to give up his/her great health concern
and switch to Brand A. On the other hand, the moderate health lover, who weighs the
inconsistency concern slightly higher, may find
to

and

and

attractive enough comparing

.

For a consistency lover who puts more weight on the concern of inconsistency
between safety and price than health concern, his/her concave utility curve is shown in
Figure 3.2b. Compared to the situation in Figure 3.2a, a much lower inconsistency index
of Brand A

can lead to the choice of Brand A. Even when

expected inconsistency index of Brand B

is lower than the

, the consistency lover may still choose

Brand A. When Brand B has a higher probability to be safer (

increases), the

consistency lover can switch to Brand B at a slightly higher price and/or lower safety
level, comparing to the situation before

increases. Brand B can be very attractive only
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when it has slight higher price and/or much safer level than Brand A. Even the
consistency lover with great concern on inconsistency is willing to give up Brand A for
this Brand B.
Parents’ choice of milk is influenced by the relative magnitude of inconsistency
indices of brands A and B. The relative magnitude of inconsistency is determined by the
relative magnitude of price difference and safety difference. When the safety difference
dominates the price difference, the difference of expected inconsistency index of Brand B
and inconsistency index of Brand A

will increase, vise versa.

In Figure 3.4, I summarize the choice of milk by different types of parents with
difference relationship of price difference and safety difference. Both health lovers and
consistency lovers will choose Brand B with higher price and safety claim if the safety
difference significantly overwhelms the price difference, vise versa. But when the safety
difference does not significantly overwhelms the price difference, an extreme consistency
lover switches to Brand A with lower price and no safety claim first, followed by
moderate consistency lover, and vise versa.
From the aggregate level, when there are equal amount of identical moderate and
extreme health and consistency lovers, and the probability of Brand B having high safe
level is 50%, I would expect that half of parents choose Brand A and the other half
choose Brand B. A larger share of health lovers will increase the amount of parents who
choose Brand B. Safer Brand B can also make both risk seekers and risk averters more
likely to choose Brand B. However, risk averters or seekers were not identical. The shape
and location of utility curve can vary across parents, which lead to unique threshold
and different choices for each parent even when they face the same options.
67

In summary, I have found in previous sections that some components from utility
function (1) (e.g., food expenditure, etc.) influence parents’ choice of milk. But one
important influence may come from the relative magnitude of safety difference and price
difference between brands A and B, coupled with parents’ risk aversion to the
inconsistency between price and safety, that reflects how parents weigh health concern
and inconsistency concern. Reasons for choosing Brand B include: (1) Assume Brand B
has a 50% chances to be safe. There are the same amount of identical extreme and
moderate health lovers and consistency lovers. Price difference and safety difference do
not dominate each other. I would expect half of parents choose Brand A and the other
half choose Brand B. A larger share of extreme and moderate health lovers will result in
the choice of Brand B by a majority of parents; (2) When parents are not identical, for
parents who are more extreme health lovers, they are more likely to choose Brand B even
when the safety difference is very small and the price difference is very large between
brands A and B; (3) An increase of safety difference and/or a decrease of price difference
can cause more people to choose Brand B. When safety difference overwhelms price
difference, even risk averters can switch to Brand B, especially the more moderate ones.
Therefore, majority of parents will choose Brand B, regardless of their risk aversion to
the inconsistency.
The result of this model provides some potential answers to questions raised in
section 5. The majority of parents chose Brand B with higher price and safety claim, even
those who somewhat did not trust the safety claim of Brand B. Given the food safety
situation at the time of survey, it is highly possible that the majority of parents were
health lovers and therefore were more likely to choose Brand B.
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Also, when parents made their choice, they were considering the relative
magnitude of price difference and safety difference. Therefore, the price difference for
parents who somewhat did not trust the safety claim may not overwhelm the safety
difference when the price of Brand B is 12 yuan and less, given their risk aversion and
individual utility. It is possible that those parents belong to extreme health lover in the
second column or even the third/fourth columns of Figure 3.4. When the price of Brand B
rises to 15 yuan, the price difference does overwhelm the safety difference and majority
of parents chose Brand A.
However, to empirically test this theoretical model with risk aversion, I need data
on risk aversion to the inconsistency between price and safety. This data is not available
from my survey and may also be difficult to collect. For future study, I may use
clustering methods to group my observations into possible health lovers and consistency
lovers, and then incorporate the group information into my empirical model for the
choice of milk.

3.7 Discussion and Conclusion
Parents’ hypothetical choice of milk found in this study shows they tended to
make anti-lemons choice and demanded for safer milk in general. It provides some
evidence to support the hypothesis that in markets where products differ in terms of
safety level but the true safety levels are unknown to consumers, consumers’ choice may
not follow the lemons principle. This is because even though concern about inconsistency
between price and safety level can lead to the choice of a lemon, the concern on safety
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risk provides an opposite incentive that can lead to the anti-lemons choice. Consumers’
choice can be influenced by how they weigh these two concerns.
However, when the safety difference significantly dominates the price difference
between two products, I would expect a stronger tendency of an anti-lemons choice,
regardless of how consumers weigh the two concerns. My empirical result supports this
and shows a higher probability of making anti-lemons choice when the perceived safety
level increases and the price decreases for the expensive brand of milk with safety claim.
Paying a relatively small additional cost for a relatively much safer product can be
attractive even for some consistency lovers who have more concern about the
inconsistency between price and safety.
As discussed previously, consumer choice in this type of market can cause issues.
Information asymmetry allows some producers to make a higher profit by selling unsafe
products with higher prices, which further distorts the market. This happened in China
when safety risks were found in some imported milk products that used to be perceived
safer by consumers. These producers not only put negative influence on consumers’
welfare, but also make it difficult for producers of safe products to compete with them
because producers of safe products have additional cost to ensure safety. Also,
consumers’ choice may lead to an increase of price, which may raise the burden
especially for low-income households or lead some households to switch to cheap and
unsafe substitutes.
Similar to the lemons principle, reducing information asymmetry is a possible
solution for market failure in this type of market. However, this can be costly and
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difficult to achieve for every product especially when many small producers exist in the
market.
There are some possible alternatives. If producers in a market have a negative
reputation, the business of all producers will be influenced. Some producers may realize
this and therefore are willing to provide safe products. Producers of safe products and
consumers can have some mutual interest in this type of market. These producers can
provide desired products for consumers, while consumers’ demand and financial support
can help these producers to survive in the market. To increase demand for their products,
these producers only need to accumulate good reputation to increase perceived safety
level of their products among consumers, such that the difference of perceived safety
level between their products and other products can significantly dominate the price
difference. Policymakers can also create some incentives to increase the long run benefit
of producing safe products.
Even though safety is an important issue in this type of market, consumers’ choice
can lead to a segmented market where low-income households may not be able to afford
expensive safer products and end up purchasing cheap and less safe products.
Policymakers should also consider welfare of low-income households and implement
policies to reduce safety risks for them.
The timing of this survey may be special. Parents were very concerned about food
safety at the time of the survey, which may explain such a strong preference to expensive
milk with safety claim. In a less extreme case, I would expect a smaller difference
between the proportion of parents who choose brands A and B. Also, the purchase of
food is not an expensive one-time choice consumers have to face in a long time period
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(i.e., a durable good such as a car). If they do find safety issues in those foods that are
claimed to be safe, they can easily switch to a substitute. People’s behavior may change
for an expensive one-time choice.
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Table 3.1 Definitions and descriptive statistics of variables
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Variable
Dependent variable
ChoseBrandB
Independent variables
School
School1
School2
School3
School4
School5
School6
School7
School8
ConcernLevel
NotConcerned
SomewhatConcerned
FairlyConcerned
VeryConcerned
NumLocalNews
NonLocalNews
StorePublication
PublishInspection
NotPublishInspection
NotSureInspection
Knowledge

Meaning

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

A parent chose Brand B (claimed safe) milk a

0.80

0.40

0

1

The first school in Changsha city
The second school in Changsha city
The third school in Changsha city
The fourth school in Changsha city
The first school in Huaihua city
The second school in Huaihua city
The third school in Huaihua city
The fourth school in Huaihua city
Concern level of current food quality and safety in Hunan
Not at all concerned
Somewhat concerned
Fairly concerned
Very concerned
The number of recent local news report food safety issues a respondent have
heard about, which are listed in the survey question
Whether a respondent have heard about a recent non-local news report food
safety issues, which is listed in the survey question
Publication of food safety inspection results by store/market where you
purchase food
Store publishes food inspection results
Store doesn’t publish food inspection results
Not sure if store publishes food inspection results
A knowledge index on food labels and food safety management systems. The

0.08
0.11
0.18
0.11
0.14
0.14
0.12
0.13

0.27
0.31
0.38
0.31
0.35
0.35
0.32
0.34

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0.01
0.23
0.39
0.36

0.11
0.42
0.49
0.48

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

1.46

0.68

0

2

0.57

0.50

0

1

0.13
0.60
0.27
3.58

0.34
0.49
0.44
1.46

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
7

CheckSafetyInfo
NeverCheckInfo
SometimesCheckInfo
FairlyOftenCheckInfo
VeryOftenCheckInfo
PriceImportant
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FoodExp
AffordableExp
DecreaseExp
DecreaseSaving
DecreaseLeisure
DereaseOther
MilkFrequency
DrinkLessThan1
DrinkAtLeast1
DrinkAlmostDaily
MilkPrice
Price6
Price9
Price12

survey provides three food safety management systems (HACCP, ISO9000,
ISO22000) and five food labels (pollution-free agricultural product, green
food, quality safety, organic food and a fake one). Those systems and labels
are supposed to help improving food safety and guide people’s choice of food
brands. The survey asked parents if they had heard of/seen or even know the
meaning of those labels and systems. For each system or label, heard of/seen it
or even know the meaning represents 1 point, 0 point otherwise. Parents can
get up to 7 points in total. But they lose half of the points if they had heard
of/seen or even knew the meaning of the fake label.
Frequency of using mass media to check food safety information
Never
Sometimes
Fairly often
Very often
Respondent agreed that “price is one of the most important characteristics to
identify safe food”
Monthly food expenditure per capita in yuan
Affordable increase in food expenditure per capita in yuan
Additional food expenditure would decrease…
Saving
Leisure
Other
Frequency of children drinking milk
Less than once a week
At least once a week
Almost every day
Milk price of Brand B in yuan per 250ml
6 yuan
9 yuan
12 yuan

0.08
0.30
0.45
0.16

0.27
0.46
0.50
0.37

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

0.01
449.35
166.86

0.12
177.39
119.82

0
41.67
4.17

1
1000
750

0.32
0.59
0.09

0.47
0.49
0.28

0
0
0

1
1
1

0.10
0.24
0.67

0.29
0.43
0.47

0
0
0

1
1
1

0.24
0.26
0.25

0.43
0.44
0.43

0
0
0

1
1
1

Price15
TrustLevelClaim
NotTrust
SomewhatNotTrust
Neutral
SomewhatTrust
Trust
ShoppingLocation
ShopWetMarket
ShopSupermarket
Averting
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15 yuan
Trust level of the special safety claim by the producer of Brand B milk
Not at all trust
Somewhat not trust
Neutral
Somewhat trust
Completely trust
Location of grocery shopping
Wet market or other
Supermarket
The number of averting behaviors to avoid unsafe food. Those behaviors
include avoid food with high safety risk, only choose brands you trust, use
tricks to choose relatively safer food, make processed food at home, grow
vegetables or raise poultry by yourself, get agricultural products from you
farmer relatives, purchase imported foods, other
Experience
Result from previous experience of dealing with food that has a quality or
safety problem
SatisfiedSpentLittle
Satisfied & spent a little time and energy
SatisfiedSpentMuch
Satisfied & spent too much time and energy
NotSatisfiedSpentLittle Not satisfied & spent a little time and energy
NotSatisfiedSpentMuch Not satisfied & spent too much time and energy
NoAction
Not take action
Male
Male
FoodJob
Have friends or relatives with food related job
Age
Age
Education
Years of education
a
The number of observation is 1,143.
b
All indicator variables in this table take 1 if it is true, 0 otherwise.

0.26

0.44

0

1

0.04
0.21
0.29
0.42
0.04

0.19
0.41
0.46
0.49
0.19

0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1

0.17
0.83

0.38
0.38

0
0

1
1

3.06

1.40

0

7

0.19
0.18
0.21
0.17
0.25
0.40
0.38
37.31
13.27

0.39
0.38
0.41
0.38
0.44
0.49
0.48
6.29
2.62

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
24
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
74
22

Table 3.2 Comparison between sample and city population
Sample
City Population
Changsha
Huaihua
Changsha
Huaihua
Annual food expenditure per
[4870,6496] [4391, 5992]
7366
4446
capita a,b,c
Years of education d
13.1
13.5
12.5
8.5
a
Since the food expenditure data gathered through my survey is categorical, I use the lower and
higher bounds of each category to calculate the lowest and highest possible average per capita food
expenditure, which is the range in sample.
b
Population data source: Statistical Bureau of Hunan Province
c
Since Hunan Statistical Yearbook 2014 does not include food expenditure data from 2013, I use
food expenditure data from 2012 with adjustment of inflation.
d
Population years of education in Huaihua is 2010 data.
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Currently there are two brands of milk (milk A and milk B) in domestic market. They look the
same except the price and safety claim. Which brand would you choose for your children?
Milk A
Milk B
Price:
Safety claim:

I choose

￥3/250ml
There is no special safety claim from
the producer.

A

￥6/250ml
The producer claims that they
guarantee the safety of this milk.

B

Figure 3.1 Sample question that simulates the choice in the “lemons principle”
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Table 3.3 Estimated result of logistic regression and marginal effect of the final model
Model 1: Full Model
ChoseBrandB

Model 2: Selected Model

Model 2: Marginal Effect of Independent
Variables at Mean
Delta-method
dy/dx
Std. Err.
P>z

Coef.

Std. Err.

P>z

Coef.

Std. Err.

P>z

Price9

-0.082

0.270

0.762

-0.063

0.267

0.814

-0.005

0.022

Price12

-0.559

0.258

0.031

-0.551

0.255

0.030

-0.056

0.026

0.031

Price15

-0.986

0.258

<0.001

-0.931

0.253

<0.001

-0.110

0.030

<0.001

NotTrust

-2.316

0.415

<0.001

-2.251

0.406

<0.001

-0.504

0.082

<0.001

SomewhatNotTrust

-1.076

0.207

<0.001

-1.002

0.200

<0.001

-0.205

0.041

<0.001

SomewhatTrust

1.683

0.253

<0.001

1.741

0.251

<0.001

0.158

0.024

<0.001

Trust

2.668

1.047

0.011

2.728

1.039

0.009

0.184

0.028

<0.001

PriceImportant

2.158

1.141

0.059

2.391

1.132

0.035

0.265

0.125

0.033

FoodExp

0.001

0.001

0.050

0.002

0.001

0.003

<0.001

<0.001

0.003

AffordableExp

0.002

0.001

0.103

DecreaseSaving

-0.181

0.192

0.345

DecreaseOther

0.267

0.338

0.430

DrinkLessThan1

-0.047

0.285

0.869

-0.076

0.277

0.785

-0.009

0.034

0.789

DrinkAtLeast1

0.335

0.222

0.131

0.334

0.218

0.126

0.035

0.021

0.104

School1

0.578

0.413

0.161

0.654

0.400

0.102

0.081

0.047

0.084

School2

0.198

0.357

0.578

0.341

0.341

0.316

0.047

0.047

0.312

School3

0.295

0.311

0.343

0.364

0.300

0.225

0.050

0.042

0.235

School4

0.302

0.349

0.387

0.359

0.337

0.287

0.049

0.046

0.283

School5

0.634

0.327

0.052

0.588

0.320

0.066

0.075

0.041

0.071

MilkPrice
0.813

TrustLevelClaim
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DecreaseExp

MilkFrequency

School

School6

0.400

0.335

0.233

0.477

0.327

0.145

0.063

0.043

0.147

School7

1.200

0.369

0.001

1.139

0.361

0.002

0.120

0.039

0.002

ShopWetMarket

-0.234

0.220

0.286

Male

0.147

0.187

0.430

Age

0.003

0.015

0.858

Education

-0.001

0.039

0.988

NotConcerned

1.939

1.140

0.089

1.964

1.134

0.083

0.102

0.027

<0.001

SomewhatConcerned

-0.358

0.247

0.148

-0.361

0.239

0.131

-0.044

0.030

0.142

FairlyConcerned

-0.017

0.214

0.935

-0.002

0.209

0.993

<0.001

0.022

0.993

PublishInspection

0.290

0.282

0.304

NotSureInspection

0.078

0.204

0.703

0.226

0.387

0.559

-0.111

0.285

0.697

0.106

0.268

0.693

Averting

0.191

0.069

0.006

0.175

0.066

0.008

0.019

0.007

0.008

NumLocalNews

0.199

0.138

0.149

0.217

0.132

0.100

0.024

0.015

0.101

NonLocalNews

0.187

0.187

0.317

Knowledge

-0.091

0.068

0.178

FoodJob

-0.295

0.182

0.105

-0.265

0.177

0.135

-0.029

0.020

0.134

-0.411

0.271

0.130

-0.419

0.264

0.112

-0.050

0.032

0.124

-0.154

0.286

0.589

-0.135

0.279

0.628

-0.014

0.030

0.632

-0.134

0.260

0.605

-0.134

0.255

0.597

-0.014

0.027

0.599

0.026

0.289

0.929

0.042

0.282

0.882

0.004

0.028

0.881

0.003

0.953

0.997

-0.102

0.488

0.835

ConcernLevel

StorePublication
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CheckSafetyInfo
NeverCheckInfo
SometimesCheckInfo
FairlyOftenCheckInfo

Experience
SatisfiedSpentLittle
SatisfiedSpentMuch
NotSatisfiedSpentLittle
NotSatisfiedSpentMuch
Constant

N
Log likelihood
a

1143

1143

-428.908

-435.381

The dependent variable is a parent choosing Brand B (claimed safe) milk.
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Table 3.4 Probability of choosing Brand B (more expensive with safety claim) at different prices
and trust levelsa
Trust level of safety claim for Brand B
Price of Brand
Not at all
Somewhat
Somewhat
Completely
B
trust
not trust
Neutral
trust
trust
6 yuan
38%
69%
86%
97%
99%
9 yuan
37%
67%
85%
97%
99%
12 yuan
26%
56%
77%
95%
98%
15 yuan
20%
46%
70%
93%
97%
a
Remaining independent variables are set to their mean value.
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Notes:

: inconsistency index for Brand A

: inconsistency index for Brand B with high price and low safety level
: inconsistency index for Brand B with high price and high safety level
: expected inconsistency index for Brand B

Figure 3.2 Choice of milk by health lover and consistency lover

Figure 3.3 Extreme health lover vs. moderate health lover based on Figure 3.2a
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Figure 3.4 Choice of milk by different groups

CHAPTER 4: A Dynamic Game of Pollution Emissions and Resource Extraction

4.1 Introduction
Climate change is a serious global concern, due to negative externalities and the
uncertainty of the impact on, for example, food security and human health (McMichael
2013; Wheeler and von Braun 2013). Human activities are a significant factor in climate
change. In this study I explore the dynamic interaction of human activity, which
influence climate over time. A better understanding of these interactions can provide
insight into strategies for responding to climate change.
Climate change, the long-term change in prevailing weather conditions, is
partially manifested through changing temperatures. The world average temperature level
increased by 1.5°F over the past century and is forecast to increase even further in the
future. However, there is a great deal of uncertainty and variation in projected
temperatures ranging from 0.5 to 8.6°F over the next century (EPA 2017a). Human
activities, especially the use of fossil fuel, contribute to climate change by generating
greenhouse gases (GHG). As a major component of GHG, global emissions of CO2 have
increased by 90% since 1970 (EPA 2017b). The rapid increase in emissions leads to
higher concentrations of GHG in the atmosphere that trap heat and change the climate.
Fossil fuel is an important source of energy for economic development and
people’s daily lives. At the current time, fossil fuel use will generate more GHGs.
Sustainable development requires finding a balance between uses of fossil fuel and
mitigation of climate change. Moreover, GHG are stock pollutants. Even GHG emissions
from one region can increase GHG concentrations and lead to global impact.
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Climate change policies should be implemented to mitigate climate change.
Command-and-control, as a direct regulation, sets pollution reduction targets for firms.
However, it may not be efficient if firms have the same pollution reduction target but
different marginal reduction cost. Therefore, market approaches, such as cap-and-trade,
are increasingly popular.
Cap-and-trade sets a total emissions cap for all agents and allows them to
purchase pollution permits, based on permit price and pollution reduction costs. Currently,
there are several international and regional cap-and-trade systems in the world. The
European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is the world’s first major carbon
market based on the cap-and-trade approach. It covers 45% of CO2 emissions in the EU
and is targeting a reduction of 40% of GHGs by 2030 compared with 1990 levels. The
allocation of permits is mostly free and by auctioning. In Phase II (2008 to 2012) of the
EU ETS, total emissions were less than the allocated permits allowed for all years except
2008, and price decreased due to an imbalance of supply and demand for permits (IETA
2015). As the largest CO2 emitter in the world, China has begun to develop its own
regional ETS in 2013, which includes five cities and two provinces, using free allocation
of permits (IETA 2016).
Understanding the interactions of societies can provide insight for economic and
environmental policies. In this study, I develop a model for a differential game to explore
how two agents react to the other player’s polluting behavior and how they balance the
use of fossil fuel and mitigation of climate change under a cap-and-trade system. This
study contributes to the dynamic pollution game literature by simultaneously considering
resource extraction, the use of clean technology and carbon trade in the model. It also
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uses general functional forms and, therefore, allows for a more complete consideration of
outcomes than the extant literature, where linear functional forms are the norm.
In section two, I summarize previous studies on dynamic pollution games. In
section three, I present a dynamic game of resource extraction and GHG emissions for
two agents under a cap-and-trade system using a general functional form, and discuss the
optimal time path of resource extraction and GHG emissions under different scenarios. In
section four, I discuss conclusions about the model.

4.2 Literature Review
There is a large literature focused on dynamic analysis of pollution and resources.
A comprehensive review summarizes studies of pollution games with different control
instruments and different interactions among agents in the game (Jørgensen, MartínHerrán, and Zaccour 2010). A common set up of the model is to optimize welfare/benefit
or cost for each agent in a non-cooperative game and for all agents in a cooperative game,
with a dynamic pollution stock constraint that is influenced by emissions from all agents.
Studies may add other components into the basic model, such as a dynamic capital stocks
constraint (Jørgensen and Zaccour 2001).
Among the control instruments, a Pigouvian tax and cap-and-trade system are
better than a command-and-control approach in terms of minimizing the total cost
(Bertrand 2013). But non-constant emission permits from cap-and-trade can have even
lower expected costs than non-constant taxes (Yates 2012).
Cap-and-trade sets a ceiling for emissions and allows for the trade of emission
permits among different agents in a market. It can be considered as a market solution to
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market failure caused by externality. The “Coase Theorem” (Coase 1960) provides a
theoretical foundation for a cap-and-trade policy intervention. Unless circumstances such
as non-constant marginal transaction costs, significant market power in a permit market,
etc. appear, the initial allocation of tradable emission permits does not influence the
market equilibrium and the total cost of emission reduction is minimized under a capand-trade system (Hahn and Stavins 2011). Permit trade can also be temporally flexible.
Time-dependent inter-temporal trade of permits may lead to socially optimal emission
levels (Legras and Zaccour 2011).
The empirical results are somewhat contradictory. Weak evidence of
independence between emissions and the allocation of permits for nitrogen oxide is found
in Southern California’s Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (Fowlie and Perloff
2013). But the data from the Acid Rain Program in the U.S. shows the aggregate
emission rate of sulfur dioxide vary between scenarios where closing plants or new
entrants obtain initial permits (Dardati 2014).
There are different approaches to the allocation of permits, including
grandfathering (based on historic emissions) and auctioning and benchmarking (based on
output and sector common benchmarks). While an auctioning approach is most efficient
in the long run, the cost makes firms in the cap-and-trade system less competitive than
firms outside the system. The benchmarking approach compensates firms and maintains
the incentive for pollution abatement compared with the grandfathering approach
(Zetterberg et al. 2012).
Some studies focus on the quantity of permits and investigate the use of a market
stability reserve (MSR). MSR adjusts the number of permits auctioned based on the
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previous surplus of permits. MSR is well-equipped to handle the issue of overly supplied
permits that causes a lack of incentives for the investment of clean technologies (Perino
and Willner 2015). This adjustment can improve the overall cost effectiveness
(Kollenberg and Taschini 2016). But it may increase price volatility (Perino and Willner
2015). Other studies focus on the price of permits. Inter-temporal tradable permits allows
firms to adjust permit portfolio allocations across time and the corresponding price
dynamics can be applied to CO2 option pricing (Chesney and Taschini 2012).
The emissions cap places a limit on the level of pollution and, therefore, controls
the damage from pollution. Firms’ profits or decisions to enter/exit the market are not
relevant to the emission cap (Anouliès 2017). However, for one agent, when two
resources are available with one cleaner than the other, the dirtier resource may be used
first to take advantage of natural decay when emissions are below the cap, and then
switch to the cleaner resource and then back to the dirtier resource again (Chakravorty,
Moreaux, and Tidball 2008).
There is substitution between the purchase of permits and the abatement of
pollution. The tradeoff between these two approaches to handle pollution can be
addressed in the dynamic model (Liski and Montero 2011). The decision to adopt cleaner
technologies for countries that do not cooperate is not influenced by their neighbors’
behaviors (Boucekkine, Krawczyk, and Vallée 2011). Cleaner technologies also have
issues associated with free-riding (Harstad 2012).
But other changes of an agent’s behaviors can influence other agents. A decrease
in damage costs for one country can put pressure to reduce emissions on other countries
(Benchekroun and Taherkhani 2014). Uncertainties about future payoffs also influence
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emissions. An agent with more optimistic beliefs about the risk of pollution will increase
his/her emissions while other agents decrease their emissions. This is associated with an
increase in total emissions and vise versa (Masoudi, Santugini, and Zaccour 2016).
Other studies focus on tax as the control instrument for pollution. Discussions
include the influence of different taxes, the optimal tax plan, etc. (Canton, Soubeyran,
and Stahn 2008; Liski and Tahvonen 2004; Vossler, Suter, and Poe 2013).
Due to the lack of a central planner for international trans-boundary pollution
issues, countries may form coalitions such as an international environmental agreement.
Some study topics are related to international environmental regimes/agreements, such as
the dynamic decision to join or leave such a coalition and effectiveness of such a
coalition (Rubio and Ulph 2007; Young 2011).
Others explore the dynamic game of resource trade with consideration of
pollution. There is also a comprehensive review of those studies (Long 2011).
In this paper, I develop a non-cooperative dynamic game model of GHG
emissions and the extraction of polluting nonrenewable resource. This model allows for
two agents who maximize social welfare with constraints on resource extraction,
pollution stock and emission cap. I discuss the optimal resource extraction and pollution
emissions for both identical and heterogenous agents.

4.3 A Dynamic Game of Pollution and Resource
4.3.1 Theoretical Model
To present a simple model, I assume there are only two agents. They do not know
each other’s strategy or the state of the differential game of pollution and resource. Both
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agents implement open loop strategies with control variables depending only on time.
They each extract one single polluting nonrenewable resource independently. There is no
trade of this resource between the two agents. When they use this resource to produce
energy, they also generate GHG, which has a negative impact on both the other agent and
themselves through the GHG stock in the air. In order to emit GHG, they need to buy
emissions permits from a third party. The third party has a limited number of permits to
offer at each time interval and the number can decrease over time.
For the nonrenewable resource, assume
for agent

.

and

is the quantity of the extraction at time

is the utility of the extracted resource for agent . I assume that

(Chakravorty, Magné, and Moreaux 2003). This means that the

agent derives utility from the resource, but the more resource it extracts, the less utility it
obtains from an extra unit of the resource.

is the total cost of extraction for agent . To

simplify the model, I assume the cost of extraction is only related to the level of
extraction. Extraction raises the cost through increasing marginal cost. Therefore,
and

.

is the stock of the nonrenewable resource for agent .

For pollution, assume

is the quantity of the pollution generated by

the resource under the current technology for agent . I assume
linear relationship, which is
bought by agent .

and

.

and

units of

have a positive

is the number of emissions permits

is the number of emissions permit bought by agent

). I assume that one unit of the permits is the same as one unit of the pollutant emissions.
So

and

are the permitted emissions for agent and .

technology that keeps the emissions level at
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is the total cost of the new

for agent and depends on

and

. I

assume

and

(Germain et al. 2003). This means that if an agent is

permitted to increase pollution emitted, the agent can spend less on technology to
eliminate the rest part of pollution. The marginal cost of technology will decrease as the
amount of permitted pollution rises because it becomes easier to eliminate pollution when
more pollution is emitted.
be similar to

, the total pollution generated by using the resource, should

with the opposite impact on

. Similarly, the cost of technology is also

assumed to increase as the amount of total pollution increases at an increasing rate, which
means

and

. Also, when permitted emissions increase, the positive

marginal cost of technology from total pollution should decrease. Therefore,
.

is an emissions cap set by a third party.

is the per unit price of emissions permits

and assumed to depend on the total permitted emissions demanded by the two agents in a
permit auction (Lopomo et al. 2011). The price increases with more permits demanded.
To simplify the model, I assume a linear relationship between price and the permitted
pollution. Therefore,

and

.

is the stock of the pollution.

is the

damage from the pollution stock for agent . The damage increases with the pollution
stock at an increasing rate, which means
2000).

and

(Toman and Withagen

is the change in the pollution stock and depends on the permitted emissions of

both agents and the pollution stock. Most studies assume there is natural abatement of
pollution as a proportion of the pollution stock. The change of the pollution stock is the
difference between total permitted emissions and pollution abatement. Therefore,
,

,

, and

.
92

The goal of agent is to maximize social welfare while considering dynamic
resource and pollution constraints and the emissions cap as follows:

The generalized Lagrangian is written as

where

is the marginal user cost of resource.

of the pollutant stock. Given that the pollution stock is a bad,

.

is the marginal value
.

,

, and

are shadow values for resource, emissions and the emissions cap respectively.
The first order conditions include

Equation (4.7) shows that the discounted marginal net benefit of the resource should be
equal to its marginal user cost, which reflects the opportunity cost of resource extraction.
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This is consistent with the Hotelling model. Equation (4.8) shows that the discounted
marginal cost of emissions should be equal to the marginal value of change in the
pollution stock and the marginal value of emissions.
The adjoint conditions are

Equation (4.9) shows that the marginal user cost of the resource does not change over
time. This is a simplified situation under the model assumption that the extraction cost
does not depend on the resource stock. Equation (4.10) shows that the change in the
marginal value of the pollutant stock is equal to the difference between the discounted
marginal damage of the pollution stock and the marginal value of decay of the pollution
stock.
Equation (4.10) can be used to solve for

Multiplying both sides of equation (4.10’) by

Integrating both sides yields
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. Rewrite equation (4.10) as

I obtain

where

is any constant. Taking the time derivative of equation (4.10”) yields

The complementary slackness conditions are

Equations (4.12) and (4.13) mean the shadow values are zero as long as there are
resource extraction and pollution emissions. Otherwise these are positive shadow values.
Equation (4.14) means that only when the total emissions of two agents reach the
emissions cap, the emission cap has a positive marginal value. If the total emissions do
not reach the emissions cap, the emissions cap does not have a marginal value.
Taking the time derivative on equation (4.7) yields

The linear assumption of the emissions function can simplify equation (4.15) as
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Plugging equation (4.9) into equation (4.15’) and solving for

According to the assumption of the signs of derivatives,

I obtain

. This means resource

extraction and pollution emissions change in the same direction, which is reasonable.
Taking the time derivative on equation (4.8) yields

The linear assumptions for the permit price

and the change of pollution stock

discussed in section 4.3.1 can simplify equation (4.17) as

Plugging equation (4.11) into equation (4.17’) and solving for
and

I obtain
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as a function of both

Plugging equation (4.16) into equation (4.18) and solving for
without

I obtain
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as a function of
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where

if there is resource extraction.

pollution emissions.

if there are resource extraction and

if the emissions cap is not binding.

Equation (4.19) reflects the relationship of the pollution emissions change

between the two agents. However, the sign of

is unknown. If
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Then

and the two pollution emissions will increase or decrease at the same time. If

then the two pollution emissions change in the opposite direction. In the real world, many
societies realize the impact of climate change and start to put forth mutual effort to
reduce emissions. Therefore, I may expect emissions of different societies decrease at the
same time in the long run.

4.3.2 MATHEMATICAL APPROACH FOR A GENERAL FORM OF SOLUTION
By asymmetry, there is also an equation for pollution emissions of agent that
depends on pollution emissions of agent . When the specific functional forms and
parameters are available, these two equations allow me to solve for

and

and

obtain a system of non-linear differential equations of emissions for the two agents in the
following form

then I can use the following Taylor series expansion to approximate the non-linear
system around point

, where
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Let

When

If

and

, the two distinct real eigenvalues are

, then

. All trajectories pass through

and this equilibrium point is an asymptotically stable node. If
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and

, then

. All trajectories pass through
an unstable node. If

, then

and this equilibrium point is
. Only some trajectories pass through

and this equilibrium point is a saddle point.
When

If

, the two complex eigenvalues are

, then the real part is negative. All trajectories approach

this equilibrium point is an asymptotically stable spiral. If
positive. All trajectories depart from
unstable spiral. If

and

, then the real part is

and this equilibrium point is an

, then all trajectories are closed curves around

and this equilibrium point is a center point.
When

If

, the repeated eigenvalue is

, then

. All trajectories pass through

point is likely to be an asymptotically stable improper node. If
trajectories pass through

and this equilibrium
, then

. All

and this equilibrium point is likely to be an

unstable improper node.
Equation (4.19) is a complicated equation with possible uncertainty on the signs
in each part. The system equations (4.20) for the model in this study are even more
complicated because they should be solved using equation (4.19) and its symmetric
equation for

. The complexity of the system is the reason that most previous studies
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assume linear functional form in their models. Rather than using a specific functional
form, I take the general form with assumed derivative signs and describe some possible
optimal paths of resource extraction and emissions that could occur. Different functional
forms may influence the magnitude of paths but have similar trends.

4.3.3 POSSIBLE TIME PATH
Before I discuss the results, I want to summarize the important characteristics of
the model.


Based on the assumptions of the theoretical model, each unit of resource extracted
by an agent generates pollution.



An agent can either use technology to eliminate the pollution, or purchase permit
to emit the pollution and take the damage from more pollution stock.



A change of resource extraction can but does not necessarily change emissions in
the same direction.



The optimal levels of resource extraction and emissions should maximize social
welfare over time.
Figure 4.1 shows the relationship between the four components of social welfare
–

in equation (4.1) (net benefit of resource
cost of permits
emissions

, and damage

, and pollution stock

, technology cost
) and resource extraction

,
, pollution

for agent i. The slopes of the curves in figure 4.1

reflect the marginal net benefit of resource, marginal technology cost of eliminating the
unpermitted part of emissions (with respect to resource and emissions separately),
marginal cost of emissions permits, and marginal damage of pollution stock.
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Figure 4.1 Relationship between benefit/cost and resource extraction/emissions/GHG
stock
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The relative magnitude of the marginal values determines the optimal resource
extraction and emissions. The optimal resource extraction and emissions are reached
when a one-unit change in resource extraction and/or emissions from the optimal levels
adds a negative value to the social welfare. In other words, the optimal levels are reached
when any change in resource extraction or emissions is associate with a negative
marginal social welfare. There are several possible changes in resource extraction and/or
emissions. In the following sections, I will discuss the static behaviors for an independent
agent. Then I will discuss the dynamics of two agents with interactions.
The basic idea is that at each time period, an agent has two choices to eliminate
one unit of GHG generated from resource, either use technology to eliminate it with a
marginal cost
of

, or purchase permits to emit pollution with a marginal cost and damage
. After determining the optimal combination for all generated GHGs,

which reflects optimal emissions levels, the agent compares the marginal net benefit
with the marginal total costs

to determine the resource extraction.

But resource extraction also influences emissions through the technology component
.

4.3.3.1 ONE AGENT’S BEHAVIOR
Assume the emissions of the other agent are fixed. To find the optimal emissions
at one time period, I assume the resource extraction stays at the optimal level. Therefore,
I can ignore the net benefit of resource extraction
function for now
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from the welfare

and focus on the costs and damage related to pollution emitted:

This allows me to explore the tradeoff between the two approaches to manage pollution:
eliminate or emit it.
A one unit increase from a certain level of emissions leads to a decrease in
technology cost (see Figure 4.1.c) and an increase in both the cost of permits (see Figure
4.1.d) and the damage from the pollution stock (see Figure 4.1.e).19 If this decrease in
technology cost

is larger than the sum of the increase in the cost of permits

damage from the pollution stock

and

, then this emissions level is not optimal. Technology

is relatively more expensive than the sum of the cost of permits and damage. Therefore,
the agent should eliminate less pollution with technology and increase emissions to lower
the cost. If this decrease in technology cost is smaller, then the agent should decrease
emissions. Similarly, a one-unit decrease related to a certain level of emissions leads to
the opposite result.
Therefore, as long as the total emissions does not exceed the emissions cap, the
optimal level of emissions occurs when the change in technology cost is equal to the sum
of changes in the cost of permits and damage from the pollution stock
, given the optimal resource extraction (see Figure 4.2.a).
If the marginal technology cost always dominates in a relatively long period of
time, then the agent should only purchase permits until the total emissions reach the cap
19

Damage of pollution stock is not directly related to emissions. But when emissions increase, pollution
stock will increase and therefore damage will increase.
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(see Figure 4.2.b). In this case, the third party, which may be the government, plays an
important role in determining the cap and the time path of emissions. If the marginal
technology cost never dominates in a relatively long period of time, then the agent should
always use technology to eliminate the pollution (see Figure 4.2.c). In this case, the
carbon market does not exist. The scenario in Figure 4.2.a is the most complicated but
realistic in the long run, because according to my assumption, the slopes of the two
curves in Figures 4.2b and 4.2c will eventually equal when the time period is long
enough. Therefore, I focus the discussion on the scenario depicted in Figure 4.2.a.

Figure 4.2 Optimal emissions for a fixed level of pollution generated by resource

The next step is to find the optimal resource extraction. When resource extraction
changes, say increases, additional GHGs are generated. At any fixed emissions level, the
agent needs to eliminate more GHGs and pay a higher technology cost

.

Therefore, compared to Figure 4.2.a, the technology cost curve shifts up (see Figure 4.3).
The increase of resource extraction increases the optimal emissions. This is because at the
old optimal emissions level, the negative slope of the new technology cost curve
larger than the slope of the sum of cost of permits and damage
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.

is

The former slope

decreases and the latter slope increases with the increase in the level of emissions.
Therefore, they eventually reach equality at the new optimal emissions level that is higher
than the old one.

Figure 4.3 Change of optimal emissions with an increase in pollution generated by
resource
For each level of resource extraction, there is an optimal emissions level. When
resource extraction is at a higher level, the optimal emissions level increases at an
increasing rate (see Figure 4.4). The reason is the costs associated with generating GHG:
the technology cost to reduce GHG, and the sum of the emissions permits cost and
damage from GHG stock for more emissions, increases with a rise in generated GHG at
an increasing rate.

Figure 4.4 Optimal resource extraction when emissions are also optimized
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The optimal level of resource extraction is determined by the relationship between
the marginal net benefit of resource extraction
and damage

and the marginal optimized costs

. Assume the resource extraction increases one unit from the

optimal level at any time period. The net benefit of resources increases (see Figure 4.1.a)
and more pollution is generated.
For a one-unit increase in resource extraction from the optimal level, the
magnitude of the increase in net benefits from increased resource extraction is smaller
than the increase of the sum of costs and damage at the optimal emissions point. Negative
marginal social welfare occurs. Similarly, a one-unit decrease in resource extraction from
the optimal level leads to the opposite result. Therefore, the optimal resource extraction
occurs at the level where the marginal net benefit of resource extraction is equal to the
sum of changes in costs and damage caused by one unit change in resource extraction,
where the combination of approaches minimizes the sum of costs and damage (see
Figure 4.4).

4.3.3.2 INTERACTIONS OF TWO AGENTS
In the previous section, I explored behaviors of one agent independently.
However, two agents in the model interact through the purchase of permits and the
pollution stock. In this section, I will explore the interaction between two agents over
time under different conditions for the two agents.
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4.3.3.2.1 IDENTICAL AGENTS
If the two agents are identical, then they should have the same time path for
emissions and resource extraction. Given that the emissions cap decreases over time, I
would expect the emissions of both agents have the same decreasing trend in the long run.
I assume the emissions cap is set by a third party. There are three possible scenarios: the
total emissions never reach the cap, emissions always reach the cap or emissions reach
the cap during certain periods. To simplify the discussion, I want to start with the
scenario where that the cap is not restricted and the total emissions never reach the cap.

4.3.3.2.1.1 THE TOTAL EMISSIONS NEVER REACH THE CAP
For different time periods, it is realistic to assume that the pollution stock will
increase at least for a certain period initially. Similar to the idea in Figure 4.3, the damage
from the pollution stock is higher at any emissions level when the pollution stock is at a
higher level because

. Therefore, the curve for the sum of the cost of permits and

damage shifts up compared with the scenario in Figure 4.2.a (see Figure 4.5).

Figure 4.5 Change of emissions with an increase in damage (holding everything else
constant)
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There are two observations from Figure 4.5. First, holding everything else
constant, the optimal emissions decrease with a higher pollution stock. Second, the sum
of costs and damage at the optimal emissions level is also higher.
For the optimal resource extraction, compared with Figure 4.4, the increase in
damage shifts the minimum sum of costs and damage curve up according to Figure 4.5.
This leads to a decrease in resource extraction over time (see Figure 4.6).

Figure 4.6 Change of “optimal” resource extraction with an increase in damage

However, there is interdependency between Figures 4.5 and 4.6 over time. Figure
4.5 is incomplete and the true optimal emissions cannot be determined. The decrease in
optimal resource extraction shown in Figure 4.6 can influence Figure 4.5 by shifting the
technology cost curve down over time (similar to Figure 4.3, but the opposite direction).
This also contributes to a decrease of optimal emissions. But this may not be the only
case and will discuss it later.
The shape and magnitude of the shift of curves in Figures 4.5 and 4.6 determines
the rate of change for optimal resource extraction and emissions. I will use Figure 4.7 to
explore it. In Figure 4.7, L1 and L4 are the initial curves of the sum of the cost of permits
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and damage curve and the initial technology cost curve. Point A on L1 and point B on L2
have the same absolute values of slope, and therefore are at the optimal emissions level.
In the second period, L1 and L4 shift to L2 and L5 respectively. In the third period, L2
and L5 shift to L3 and L6 respectively.

Figure 4.7 Change of optimal emissions over time

First, I fix L4 and consider only shifts for L1. The damage increases with the
pollution stock at an increasing rate

. Therefore, there is a larger jump

from L2 to L3 than from L1 to L2. Points C and D are at the initial optimal emissions
level as points A and B. But the slope of point C is larger than the negative slope of point
B, while the slope of point D is larger than both points B and C.
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Given the shape of the curves, L2 should have the same negative slope as L4
when the emissions level decreases from the initial optimal level, which is determined by
L1 and L4 at points A and B. The emissions level needs to decrease even further for L3.
In other words, the “optimal” emissions level decreases with shifts from L1 to L3 (ignore
the shift of L4 for now).
The rate of decrease for the “optimal” emissions level is influenced by the shape
of L1 and L4, and the magnitude of the shift of L1 over time. Assume the marginal
damage increases slowly with a higher emissions level. L1 is relatively flat and
experiences a relatively small jump to L2 and L3. The slope of points A, C, and D are
relatively close. Meanwhile, the marginal technology cost increases fast with a lower
emissions level. L4 is very steep. When the emissions level is lower, the same decrease in
emissions leads to a larger increase in the negative slope of L4.
In this case where, L1 increases to L2, the emissions level needs to decrease more
to achieve a slope that is large enough as the negative slope of L4. But from L2 to L3, the
emissions level only needs to decrease slightly further to reach a slope that is large
enough as the negative slope of L4, given the rapid increase of L4 at the lower end of the
emissions level. Because the difference of “optimal” emissions level between L1 and L2
is larger than the difference between L2 and L3, the “optimal” emissions level decreases
at a decreasing rate.
This result means if additional damage increases slowly with more emissions,
while the additional technology cost to reduce pollution increases more rapidly,
emissions would decrease. But it is not worth using more expensive technology to
eliminate more pollution per period over time, compared to slowly increased damage.
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The opposite case happens when the marginal damage increases fast with a higher
emissions level, and the marginal technology cost increases slowly with a lower
emissions level. The “optimal” emissions level decreases at an increasing rate. This
means that if the additional damage increases fast with more emissions, while the
additional cost of technology to reduce more pollution increases slowly, emissions would
also decrease. In this case, the better solution is to spend on slowly increased technology
costs to eliminate additional pollution over time as opposed to allowing increased damage
from pollution emissions.
Second, holding L1 fixed and allowing shifts in L4, the direction and magnitude
of the shifts are uncertain under this scenario. This is because the change in minimum
cost over time is uncertain. Therefore, the change in optimal resource extraction, which
directly influences L4, is uncertain. I will leave a more detailed discussion for the next
scenario where both L1 and L4 shift. But when L4 decreases, the “optimal” emissions
decreases as well (ignoring the shift of L1 for now) and vise versa.
Finally, I consider shifts in L1 and L4 simultaneously. There are three possible
scenarios:
A. L1 increases. L4 decreases at an increasing rate
The changes in L1 and L4 are shown in Figure 4.7. L2 and L5 slopes have the
same absolute value at points G and H in the second period. L3 and L6 slopes have the
same absolute value at points I and J in the third period. When L1 increases to L3 and L4
decreases to L6, the optimal emissions levels will always decrease at an increasing rate.
But the change in minimum cost is uncertain.
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A.1 Assume there is a relatively large increase from L1 to L2 to L3 and a
relatively small decrease from L4 to L5 to L6 as shown in Figure 4.7. The minimum costs
are the heights of point A plus point B in the first period, the heights of point G plus point
H in the second period, and the heights of point I plus point J in the third period. The
minimum cost increases over time at an increasing rate in this case.
Therefore, in Figure 4.6, the minimum cost curve increases at an increasing rate
over time. But the optimal resource extraction decreases at an uncertain rate. When the
minimum cost curve makes a relatively larger jump after each period, and the net benefit
curve is relatively flat, the optimal resource extraction decreases at an increasing rate.
Even though the decrease in pollution makes the technology cost curve decrease at a
decreasing rate due to the convex damage function, the increasing rate of pollution
reduction from the optimal resource extraction decrease creates an opposite effect on the
technology cost curve and may dominate to make L4 decreases at an increasing rate in
Figure 4.7.
This indicates that when the damage from the pollution stock places a greater
threat on society in the long run, technology costs to reduce pollution are much less of a
burden when less pollution is generated, and the decrease in resource extraction has a
relatively small influence on economic development, then emissions should decrease
faster over time to control the damage, while resource extraction should also decrease
faster to reach the goal in emissions reduction and may help reduce the burden of
technology costs without sacrificing too much economic development (see Figure 4.8 for
time paths).
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Figure 4.8 Time path of resource extraction and emissions

When the minimum cost curve makes a relatively smaller jump after each period,
and the net benefit curve is relatively steep, the optimal resource extraction decreases at a
decreasing rate. This makes L4 decreases at a decreasing rate in Figure 4.7, which
conflicts with the scenario I started with and, therefore, is not valid for the discussion in
section A.
A.2 When there is a relatively small increase from L1 to L2 to L3 and a relatively
large decrease from L4 to L5 to L6, I obtain the opposite result of A.1. The minimum
cost decreases over time at an increasing rate. In Figure 4.6, the minimum cost curve
increases at a decreasing rate over time. The optimal resource extraction decreases at a
decreasing rate. Similar to the discussion in situation A.1, this is not valid.
B. L1 increases. L4 decreases at a decreasing rate
Similar to the scenario in A, the optimal emissions level will always decrease
under this scenario. But the decreasing rate of the optimal emissions level and the change
in minimum costs are uncertain.
B.1 Assume there is a relatively large increase from L1 to L2 to L3 and a
relatively small decrease from L4 to L5 to L6 in Figure 4.7. The minimum cost increases
over time at an increasing rate in this case.
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Therefore, in Figure 4.6, the minimum cost curve increases at an increasing rate
over time. But the optimal resource extraction level decreases at an uncertain rate. When
the minimum cost curve experiences a relatively large increase after each period and the
net benefit curve is relatively flat, the optimal resource extraction level decreases at an
increasing rate. Similar to the discussion in A.1, this may make L4 decreases at a
decreasing rate in Figure 4.7 if the effect from the convex damage function dominates the
effect from the increasing rate of pollution reduction.
This indicates that when the damage from the pollution stock places a greater
threat on society in the long run, technology costs to reduce pollution are a relatively
heavier burden even with less pollution generated, and the decrease in resource extraction
has a relatively small influence on economic development, it may be more difficult for
the decrease in resource extraction to offset the burden of technology costs due to the
large increase in its marginal cost. But resource extraction should still decrease faster to
help reduce at least part of the burden of increased technology costs without sacrificing
too much economic development. But given the situation of technology costs, the
decreasing rate of emissions is uncertain (see Figure 4.9 for time paths).

Figure 4.9 Time path of resource extraction and possible time paths of emissions
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When the minimum cost curve makes a relatively small jump after each period,
and the net benefit curve is relatively steep, the optimal resource extraction level
decreases at a decreasing rate. L4 also decreases at a decreasing rate in Figure 4.7.
Similar to the discussion for Figure 4.9, when the damage from the pollution
stock places a greater threat on society in the long run, and the decreasing rate of
emissions is uncertain, the decrease in resource extraction has a relatively large influence
on economic development and, therefore, cannot be reduced to decrease technology costs
and influence emissions without sacrificing economic development (see Figure 4.10 for
time paths).

Figure 4.10 Time path of resource extraction and possible time paths of emissions

The scenarios depicted in Figures 4.9 and 4.10 may happen on one net benefit
curve and shift the minimum cost curve. The net benefit from resource extraction
increases significantly at a lower level of resource extraction, while increases are much
slower at higher levels of resource extraction (see Figure 4.11). The time path of resource
extraction decreases at an increasing rate and then at a decreasing rate.
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Figure 4.11 Net benefit curve and time path of resource extraction

B.2 When there is a relatively small increase from L1 to L2 to L3 and a relatively
large decrease from L4 to L5 to L6 in Figure 4.7, the minimum cost decreases at an
unknown rate. Therefore, in Figure 4.6, the minimum cost curve moves down over time.
The optimal resource extraction and emissions levels increase initially. But eventually
they will be restricted by the emissions cap.
C. L1 increases. L4 increases
Under this scenario, L1 increases to L2 and then to L3, while L4 increases to L5
and then to L6 in Figure 4.7. The minimum cost will always increase and lead to a
decrease in resource extraction. In this case, L4 cannot increase. Therefore, this is not
valid.

4.3.3.2.1.2 THE TOTAL EMISSIONS REACH THE CAP AT SOME PERIODS
When the emissions cap is relatively restrictive and total emissions reach the cap
at some time interval, actual emissions may be lower than the optimal emissions found in
section 4.3.3.2.1.1 during those periods. The actual cost is higher than the minimum cost,
which leads to a lower actual resource extraction level than the optimum. The lower
actual resource extraction level leads to a lower technology cost curve and lower
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emissions level. This may or may not lead to total emissions lower than the cap in the
next period, depending on the level of the emissions cap.
When total emissions always reach the cap, the emissions level of one agent is
always half of the cap. The resource extraction level is also influenced by the specific
path of the emissions cap.

4.3.3.2.2 DIFFERENT NET BENEFIT OF RESOURCE
Assume agent j is the same as in scenario 4.3.3.2.1 (identical agents). Assume
other characteristics for agent i are also the same, except that agent i has a higher net
benefit of resources than agent j. The optimal resource extraction for agent i is higher
than for agent j.
Compared with scenario 4.3.3.2.1, agent i produces additional pollution that is
partially reduced by technology and partially emitted. This directly shifts L1 up faster for
both agents in Figure 4.7. It also directly shifts L4 up for agent i. Agent j has a lower
resource extraction level than under scenario 4.3.3.2.1 due to the change in L1. L4 is also
lower because less pollution is generated.
Based on the previous discussion in scenario 4.3.3.2.1, agent i derives more
benefit from resource extraction and, therefore, their resource extraction may decrease
slower than that of agent j. The faster decrease in resource extraction also allows agent j
to reduce a relatively larger proportion of pollution. Therefore, the emissions level for
agent j decreases faster than that of agent i. This can be the reason that some developing
countries have difficulty to reduce pollution emissions faster.
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4.3.3.2.3 DIFFERENT TECHNOLOGY COSTS
Assume agent j is the same as under scenario 4.3.3.2.1 (identical agents). Assume
other characteristics for agent i are also the same, except that agent i has lower
technology costs than agent j. Lower technology costs allow agent i to enjoy a lower
optimal emissions level and higher optimal resource extraction level than agent j.
Compared with scenario 4.3.3.2.1, lower optimal emissions shift L1 up slower for
both agents in Figure 4.7. Agent j has higher resource extraction and emissions levels
than under scenario 4.3.3.2.1.
Due to lower technology costs, it is easier for agent i to reduce emissions and,
therefore, their emissions decrease faster than those of agent j. The minimum total cost
for agent i increases slower. Therefore, the resource extraction level for agent i decreases
slower than that of agent j. When agent i invests on clean technology, free riding from
agent j may occur, given that agent j can benefit from agent i’s behavior without cost.

4.3.3.2.4 DIFFERENT DAMAGE OF POLLUTION STOCK
Assume agent j is the same as under scenario 4.3.3.2.1 (identical agents). Assume
other characteristics for agent i are also the same, except that agent i has larger damage
from pollution stock than agent j. The optimal resource extraction and emissions levels
for agent i are lower than those of agent j.
Compared with scenario 4.3.3.2.1, the lower emissions for agent i shift L1 up at a
slower rate than for agent j. The minimum total cost for agent j is lower and the optimal
resource extraction level is higher than the scenario 4.3.3.2.1. The optimal emissions
level for agent j is also higher.
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Damage is a more serious issue for agent i. Therefore, the resource extraction and
emissions levels decrease faster for agent i compared to agent j. A more accurate measure
of damage from the pollution stock can lead to the optimal level of reduction in pollution
emissions.
In summary, the optimal time path for resource extraction and emissions levels
for each agent is related to the specific functional forms in the model, the relative
magnitude of both agents’ marginal net benefit of resource extraction, marginal
technology cost of eliminating the unpermitted portion of the pollution, marginal cost of
emissions permits, and marginal damage from the pollution stock, as well as the
emissions cap. In the long run, resource extraction and emissions levels for both agents
should decrease at different rates under different scenarios, depending on the functional
forms of equations 4.1-4.6 and the relative magnitude of marginal values in each
components of social welfare.

4.4 CONCLUSION
Climate change caused by GHG emissions is a common issue for all societies.
This study builds a theoretical model to explore optimal paths of GHG emissions and
resource extraction levels for different agents while allowing for the interaction between
two agents under a cap-and-trade policy. Compared to many other studies that assume a
linear functional form, this study uses a general functional form with specific signs on
derivatives to allow for some flexibility for the optimal time paths of resource extraction
and emissions levels. Different functional forms lead to different time paths. But the
trend in the long run should be very similar and consistent with what will happen in the
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real world. This study also allows for carbon trade and the use of technology
simultaneously, which is consistent with the real world.
To mitigate climate change without sacrificing economic development, each
society should carefully evaluate its own net benefit from resource extraction for
production related to industry and the well-being of its citizens, costs related to emissions
and damage from the pollution stock. It should also consider behaviors of other societies
to determine optimal levels.
A society may reduce the use of resources to generate less pollution, or purchase
more emissions permits to use more resources to meet the demand for economic
development. But these approaches may not be sustainable and always be feasible.
Economic development may slow down. The number of emissions permits is limited, so
a society may not purchase as many permits as they want. Moreover, a society’s optimal
resource extraction and emissions level may largely rely on other societies’ decisions.
On the other hand, a society could use cleaner resources and/or develop new
technology to reduce pollution emissions from each unit of resource extraction at a lower
cost. These approaches may help to reach goals of economic development and pollution
reduction simultaneously. They also allow a society to rely less on other societies’
decisions and, therefore, have more control over its own optimal choice of resource
extraction and emissions levels.
The model in this study does not allow for technological change over time. It also
assumes independent resource extraction and does not capture any uncertainty across
time. These issues can be addressed in future studies. Future studies can also adopt
scientific functional form and parameters for this model that simulate optimal time paths.
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION

Market failure can lead to the production of substandard products and serious and
long-lasting negative impacts on the earth and human welfare. Several issues can cause
market failure, including information asymmetry and externality. This research uses the
Chinese food market and a carbon market as examples to explore approaches to reduce
market failure from different perspectives. It investigates different consumers’ reactions
to market failure for the design of possible approaches, and reactions to several potential
policy interventions for the selection of preferred approaches; it also investigates
different societies’ reactions once a policy has been implemented.
This research contributes to the literature by extending the use of choice
experiment method to explore individual parent’s preference toward different types of
policy changes that target market failure. This research also explores the lemon principle
in the food market and finds that parents’ choices contradict the lemon principle due to
specific characteristics of the food market. Finally, this research uses a more general
model to discuss the optimal resource extraction and pollution emissions, with
consideration of carbon trade and the use of technology to deal with pollution
simultaneously.
The first study in chapter 2 estimates respondents’ MWTP for four changes
related to overall food safety: (1) a government requirement that food producers
implement a food safety management system (Management); (2) an increase in the
percentage of traceable food (Traceability); (3) publication of all food safety inspection
results on a centralized governmental website (CentralizedWeb); and (4) provision of
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routine supplemental food safety inspection by non-governmental organizations (NGO).
On average, parents were willing to pay up to 165 yuan/month for those changes, with
the highest MWTP for Management, followed by Traceability, NGO, and
CentralizedWeb. The heterogeneity in individual-specific MWTPs for these policies also
shows more than 95% of respondents supported Traceability and CentralizedWeb. In
selecting the appropriate food safety policy, decision makers may want to consider
whether the goal is to maximize funding for improving food safety or to have greater
consumer support for a policy change. Improving food traceability represents a good
mechanism for improving food safety in China, as there is relatively high average MWTP
and support from more than 95% of respondents in this survey.
The second study in chapter 3 investigates parents’ tradeoff between money and
safety risks in the food market when there is uncertainty about the true level of food
safety. The data show that parents tend to choose a brand of milk with a higher price and
safety claim (Brand B), rather than a brand with a lower price and no safety claim (Brand
A). This is true even when factors such as food expenditure, concern level of food safety,
etc. are held constant, unless the perceived safety level of Brand B is low and the relative
price of Brand B is much higher than Brand A. A possible explanation for these results is
that parents’ health concerns and the inconsistency between price and safety levels
provide opposite incentives for parent choice. Their final choice depends on how they
weigh the two concerns, which is reflected by their risk aversion to the inconsistency
between price and safety, and the relative magnitude of price difference and safety
difference between Brands A and B.
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The last study in chapter 4 explores the optimal time path of resource extraction
and GHG emissions in a dynamic game between two agents. Both time paths decrease in
the long run, but the decreasing rates vary depending on the net benefit of resource
extraction, costs of technology and emission permits, and damage from pollution stock.
Relative to the other agent, larger net benefit from resource extraction for one agent leads
to slower decreases in both optimal resource extraction and emissions for this agent;
lower technology cost leads to faster decreases in optimal emissions and slower decrease
in resource extraction; larger damage from pollution stock leads to faster decrease in both
optimal resource extraction and emissions.
Overall, safety issues caused by information asymmetry in food market can have
immediate and serious consequences on human health and lives. Parents’ willingness-topay reflects the demand for strong tools with multiple functions to solve market failure in
the food market. The preferred approach has both direct government regulation and
incentive, such as traceability information that helps consumers’ purchasing decision, for
the market to solve the problem. Parents’ choice of milk also reflects that consumers and
some producers may have mutual interest. Consumers’ concern and willingness-to-pay
for food safety may enable producers of food with high safety level to survive in the long
run. If producers of safe food can devise a way to signals this desirable safety level in the
food market, then this market approach may solve the problem without the need for
government intervention. While government approach is desirable, a market solution to
market failure in the food market without any form of government intervention may also
exist. Given the difficulty and high cost for direct regulation or providing incentives to
the tremendous number of small-scaled food producers in China, market solutions
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without government intervention may be a good supplemental approach for policies that
involves both government and market approaches.
For climate change, when the damage from pollution stock is large enough, there
will be a decrease in emissions. However, to prevent irreversible damage, policy
intervention is necessary. As a market based incentive approach, the cap-and-trade policy
can ensure the decreasing trend of total emissions by adjusting the cap over time, in a
cost efficient manner. Societies can adjust their resource extraction, use of clean
technology, and purchase of emission permits to meet the emissions cap while optimizing
social welfare. In some cases, the cap can also provide an incentive for the use of clean
resources and the investment of clean technology. For climate change, instead of direct
regulation on individual pollution emitters such as in command-and-control, it is better
for the government to carefully design a cap-and-trade system and allow the market to
solve the market failure.
Both the food market and the environmental sector desire market approaches,
probably because market solutions leave more choices for consumers or societies. For
instance, societies can purchase a reasonable amount of permits according to their
specific situation to emit pollutions under a cap-and-trade system; Consumers can use
safety information to select food with different levels of safety risks based on their
preferences and income. Some low-income consumers do not have to bear a heavy
burden from expensive safer food. But the choice of government approaches is also
reasonable. It is likely that consumers can not constantly search for safety information on
all food they consume. The existence of food with a low safety level is a great concern
for consumers. Therefore, they also want the government to ensure food safety for them.
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Findings from this dissertation provide information and raise some questions for
future studies. A cost benefit analysis can use the estimated MWTP in Chapter 2 to
evaluate the feasibility of these changes suggested to select the most beneficial change
for implementation.
Chapter 3 builds a theoretical model to explain the choice of milk while allowing
for risk aversion. This model is not limited for the food market. It may be used to explain
consumers’ choice for safety related products and provides a theoretical foundation for
empirical analysis in other markets. Future studies may use empirical data from markets
where safety is a concern to test this theoretical model. They may also provide discussion
on effective signaling from producers of safe products.
In chapter 4, technology is assumed to remain the same over time. Also, trade of
resources is not possible. Future studies may relax these assumptions. They may also
address uncertainty in the model to show more realistic time paths.
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APPENDIX A: Additional Survey Questions

1. What is your current level of concern about food quality and safety in Hunan?
Circle one.
Not at all
Somewhat
Fairly
Very
concerned
concerned
Concerned
concerned
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

2. Which of the following news did you hear or see recently? Check all that apply.

1

Ginger with Shennongdan

2

Fake lamb

3

Two people sold 40 tons of pork that die from sick

4

None of the above

3. Do any of the grocery stores or wet market at which you typically shop publish
daily food inspection results for their agricultural products to consumers? Check
one.
1

Yes

2

No

3

Not sure
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4. In the following systems and food safety labels, have you previously heard
of/seen any of them? Do you know their meaning? Check all that apply.
I
have
I have never heard
heard
of/seen and do not
of/seen it
I know it
know it
ISO 9000
1
2
3

ISO 22000

1

2

3

HACCP

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3
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5. Have frequently, if at all, do you use internet, TV, newspaper and other mass
media to check whether a brand of food is safe? Circle one.
Never
Sometimes
Fairly often
Very often
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

6. Choose the 2 most important and the 2 least important characteristics that help
you to identify whether a food is safe. Check two for each.
Most
Least
important important
Reputation of the brand
1
1
Appearance and taste of food
2
2
Price
3
3
Where the food is produced
4
4
Where the food is sold
5
5
Ingredients on the package
6
6
Manufacturing and expiration dates
7
7
Safety certification label on the
package
8
8

7. What is your average monthly food expenditure? Check one.
1 Less than ￥499
5
￥2000 – 2499
2

￥500 - 999

6

￥2500 – 2999

3

￥1000 - 1499

7

More than￥3000

4

￥1500 - 1999
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8. According to the financial situation of your household, what is the highest
affordable increase in your monthly food expenditure?
1 Less than ￥25
8
Less than ￥700
2

Less than ￥100

9

Less than ￥800

3

Less than ￥200

10

Less than ￥1000

4

Less than ￥300

11

Less than ￥1200

5

Less than ￥400

12

Less than ￥1500

6

Less than ￥500

13

More than￥1500

7

Less than ￥600

9. Which category of spending would you have to decrease first in order to afford a
higher food expenditure? Check one.
1 Savings
2

Leisure

3

Other (Please write it down)__________________________________

10. On average, how frequently does your child drink milk? Check one.
1 Never ( Go to question 13)
2

Less than once a week

3

At least once a week

4

Almost every day

11. Currently there are two brands of milk (milk A and milk B) in domestic market.
They look the same except the price and safety claim. Which brand would you
choose for your children?
Milk A
Milk B
Price:
￥3/250ml
￥6/250ml
Safety claim:

I choose

There is no special safety claim
from the producer.

A

The producer claims that they
guarantee the safety of this
milk.
B
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12. How much do you trust the safety claims of milk B in the above question? Circle
one.
Do not trust at Somewhat not
Completely
Indifferent
Somewhat trust
all
trust
trust
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

13. Where do you usually buy groceries? Check all that apply.
1 Wet market
2

Supermarket

3

Other (Please write it down) _______________________________

14. Have you ever taken any of the following actions to avoid food safety issues?
Check all that apply.
1 Avoid eating certain foods with a high food safety risk
2

Only choose the brands of food that you trust.

3
4

Use tricks you learnt from some sources to choose relatively safer food, such
as observe appearance of food.
Make your own processed food, such as soy milk, sweet wine, etc.

5

Grow vegetables or raise poultry by yourself.

6

Get agricultural products from your farmer relatives.

7

Purchase imported foods instead of domestic foods in store and/or online.

8

Other (Please write it down)___________________________________

9

No. I have never done anything special to deal with food safety issues.
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15. If you ever take any actions to deal with a food that has a quality or safety
problem, what was the result in most cases? Check one.
1

I was satisfied with the final result, and I only spent a little time and energy.

2

I was satisfied with the final result, but I spent too much time and energy.

3

4
5

I was not satisfied with the final result, but I only spent a little time and
energy.
I was not satisfied with the final result, and I spent too much time and
energy.
I have never taken any actions.

16. What is your gender? Check one.
1 Male
2

Female

17. How many people live in this household including yourself? ________

18. Does anyone in your family work in food related industry, such as food
processing, restaurant, grocery store, food inspection, etc? Check one.
1 Yes
2

No

19. What is your age? ____________________
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20. What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? Check one.
1

None

5

Junior college

2

Elementary school

6

Bachelor’s degree

3

Junior high school

7

Master’s degree

4

Senior high school

8

Doctorate degree
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APPENDIX B: Models for Chapter 2
Random utility models are used to analyze parents’ choices (). Base on the
random utility theory, respondent

intends to maximize utility

by choosing

alternative over other alternatives in a choice set (choice experiment question) . The
utility has two components:

where

is the indirect utility from a vector of all attributes

( =1,2,3) in choice set

( =1,2,3,4).

of alternative

is a vector of parameters of attributes.

is a

random component and includes all unobserved factors that impact utility.
Respondent

will choose alternative

over other alternatives if

. Therefore, the probability of respondent
set

choosing alternative in choice

is

Different assumptions allow me to use different econometric models to estimate
the parameters. The following sections will discuss the four groups of econometric
models used in this study.

Model 2.1: Multinomial logit without interaction
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Multinomial logit (MNL) model without any interaction terms is my base model.
It assumes homogeneous taste across respondents. The indirect utility function of
respondent

where

choosing alternative in a choice set

is

is an alternative specific constant that equals to 1 if status quo is chosen

and 0 otherwise. It captures potential status quo bias.
The random component

is independent and homogeneous across respondents

and follows an extreme value distribution. Therefore,

The probability

which has the logit form.
The coefficients are estimated using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE)
method, which maximize the probability of respondents choosing the plan that they are
observed to choose. The log-likelihood function is
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where

if plan or status quo is chosen and

otherwise. The estimates of

s maximize the log-likelihood function and therefore satisfy the first order condition
.

Model 2.2: Multinomial logit with interaction
The assumption of homogeneous taste is a limitation of MNL without interactions
because in reality, respondents are more likely to have different attitudes towards
attribute and the status quo. Some factors can influence or reflect respondents’ tastes,
including their financial situations, behaviors, and demographics. To capture the
influence of those factors, I want to add interactions between those factors and attributes
or ASC_sq into the indirect utility function as the following:

The probability of respondent

choosing alternative in choice set

remains B.2 in this

situation.

Model 2.3: Random parameter logit without interaction
Random parameter logit also allows for heterogeneous tastes across respondents
(McFadden and Train, 2000). It does not identify the influence of other factors as the
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MNL with interactions does. But it finds out individual parameters for each respondent.
The probability in the random parameter logit model is

Where

is the density function of random parameters .

covariance of

that need to be estimated.

represents the mean and

is the weighted average of multinomial

logit probabilities and the weights depend on the density function
There are different assumptions for the distributions of

.
, such as normal

distribution and lognormal distribution. The normal distribution allows for flexible signs
for , while the lognormal distribution may be more reasonable when I am confident that
should take a certain sign. In this study, I will make two different assumptions for the
distribution of . One assumes normal distribution for all s. The other one assumes
lognormal distribution for

of Cost and ASC_sq. I find the model with all normal

distribution has lower AIC and therefore is better.
To estimate a random parameter logit model, I need to draw a value of
the density function

and use this value of

to calculate

from

for R times.

Then I calculate the average simulated probability

Similar to the multinomial logit model, the simulated log likelihood function for the
random parameter model is
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The estimates of

maximize the simulated log likelihood function.

Models 2.4.1 and 2.4.2: Random parameter logit without interactions
Even though random parameters in the random parameter logit models capture
heterogeneous preferences among respondents, some factors may have a strong influence
on the respondents’ attitudes towards attributes or ASC_sq that need to be specified in the
model. Therefore, these two models assume indirect utility function (B.3) and probability
(B.4).
In Model 2.4.1, the standard errors of

,

,

, and

are insignificant. Therefore, I assume the coefficients of those
variables are fixed in Model 2.4.2 as the final model.
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